US Supremes Rein In Politicized Environmental Reviews

On May 29, 2025 SCOTUS ruled unanimously that NEPA (National Environmental Protection Act) can no longer be a tool for political activists against development projects.  The report from MSN is US Supreme Court limits environmental reviews in Utah railway ruling.  Excerpts in italics with my bolds and added images.

The U.S. Supreme Court dealt a setback to environmentalists on Thursday by allowing federal agencies to limit the scope of their reviews of the environmental impact of projects they regulate, as the justices bolstered a Utah railway project intended to transport crude oil.

The 8-0 ruling overturned a lower court’s decision that had halted the project and had faulted an environmental impact statement issued by a federal agency called the Surface Transportation Board in approving the railway as too limited in scope. The project was challenged by environmentalists and a Colorado county.

A coalition of seven Utah counties and an infrastructure investment group are seeking to construct an 88-mile (142-km) railway line in northeastern Utah to connect the sparsely populated Uinta Basin region to an existing freight rail network that would be used primarily to transport waxy crude oil.

The case tested the scope of environmental impact studies that federal agencies must conduct under a U.S. law called the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), enacted in 1970 to prevent environmental harms that might result from major projects. The law mandates that agencies examine the “reasonably foreseeable” effects of a project.

The ruling, authored by conservative Justice Brett Kavanaugh, was joined by four other conservative justices. The court’s three liberal justices filed a separate opinion concurring in the outcome.

Kavanaugh wrote that agencies need only consider environmental effects of a project at hand and not the “effects from potential future projects or from geographically separate projects,” and that courts must offer agencies “substantial deference” regarding the scope of these assessments.

“NEPA is a procedural cross-check, not a substantive roadblock. The goal of the law is to inform agency decision-making, not to paralyze it,” Kavanaugh wrote.

Background Post: US Supremes Hear Climate Lawfare Case to Stop Oil Railway

IER reports the news from December in article The Supreme Court Takes on a Case Involving the National Environmental Policy Act.  Excerpts in italics with my bolds and added images.

Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court recently heard a major case, Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado, that will affect the scope of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The case concerns the permitting of a proposed Utah railway that would ship oil from the Uinta Basin, potentially quadrupling its oil production. The 88-mile Uinta Basin Railway would connect the oil fields of northeastern Utah to the national rail network running alongside 100 or so miles of the Colorado River to reach oil refineries on the Gulf Coast.  According to The Hill,  at issue is whether and when upstream and downstream environmental impacts should be considered as part of federal environmental reviews. The company behind the railway and a group of Utah counties appealed a lower court decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that those indirect impacts are beyond the scope of the federal reviews.

Background

The case concerns a rail line to support oil development and mineral mining. In 2021, the federal Surface Transportation Board (STB) issued a 3,600-page environmental impact statement to comply with NEPA and approved the rail line. The NEPA mandates that federal agencies assess the environmental effects of projects within their authority. Any major initiative that is managed, regulated, or authorized by the federal government must undergo a NEPA evaluation, a process that can span years and frequently exposes projects to legal challenges.

The STB analyzed the railway’s potential effects on local water resources, air quality, protected species, recreation, local economies, the Ute Indian tribe, and other factors. Environmental groups, however, sued the agency, saying that it failed to examine sufficiently how the railway might affect the risk of accidents on connecting lines hundreds of miles away and to assess emissions in “environmental justice communities” on the Gulf Coast from increased oil shipments, among other supposed shortcomings.

According to the Wall Street Journal editorial board, “a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel sided with the plaintiffs and told the STB it must consider the line’s upstream and downstream effects even if they were hard to predict and beyond the control of the agency and developers. This includes the effects of oil shipments on Gulf Coast refiners and their contributions to climate change.” The appeals court ruling found that the federal STB violated the Endangered Species Act and the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act when it permitted the project.

Furthermore, the editorial board also explained that lower court judges—those on the D.C. and Ninth Circuits—ignored the Supreme Court’s past rulings and imposed arbitrary permitting requirements with no limiting principle. The STB lacks authority over Gulf Coast refiners and cannot prevent climate change.

Court Rulings Regarding NEPA

The Supreme Court has heard other related cases and held that agencies need not consider indirect and unpredictable impact, most recently in a 2004 case, Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen. In that case, the Supreme Court held that agencies need only analyze environmental impact with “a reasonably close causal relationship” over which they have “statutory authority” and which they can prevent.

In 2020, the Supreme Court green-lit approval for permits for the Atlantic Coast Pipeline after nearly seven years of litigation, but the pipeline was scrapped due to legal delays that raised project costs significantly. It takes an average of 4.2 years to litigate a NEPA challenge, which adds to the four or more years to obtain a federal permit. These delays are what frustrate investment in new projects, slowing job creation and economic expansion in the United States.

judge struck down a Montana coal mine permit because a federal agency did not consider the climate effects of coal combustion in Asia. Additionally, a 225-mile electric transmission line in Nebraska has been stuck in permitting for 10 years because a lower court invalidated a U.S. Fish and Wildlife permit.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court is tackling a case involving the scope of a federal environmental law, NEPA, that involves a rail line to move oil. In this case, lower courts agreed with environmental groups, who are challenging the government’s permit approval of the rail line. The case is instrumental to the issue of what should be considered when determining potential environmental damages. Congress recognizes that NEPA needs reform as delays over lawsuits have killed projects and dramatically increased their costs and it continues to debate ways to make federal permitting easier and quicker. Until that reform happens, however, Supreme Court Justices need to reign in the environmental limits of NEPA so that needed projects can progress in America.

Again, There is No Right to a Stable Climate

Twenty-two young people from across the country sued the
Trump administration over the executive orders,
which prioritize the expansion of fossil fuels.

The complaint, filed Thursday in the U.S. District Court in Montana, challenges three executive orders: “Unleashing American Energy,” “Declaring a National Energy Emergency” and “Reinvigorating America’s Beautiful Clean Coal Industry.” The lawsuit argues that with the orders, the Trump administration knowingly is advancing an agenda that will increase greenhouse gas pollution that already is stressing the global climate to a dangerous extent.

The litigation argues the situation infringes on the young people’s constitutional rights to life and liberty, as well as falling afoul of other laws approved by Congress that protect public health and the environment. The plaintiffs want the court to declare the executive orders unconstitutional, block their implementation and reaffirm the legal limits on presidential power.

“From day one of the current administration, President Trump has issued directives to increase fossil fuel use and production and block an energy transition to wind, solar, battery storage, energy efficiency, and electric vehicles (“EVs”),” the lawsuit states. “President Trump’s EOs falsely claim an energy emergency, while the true emergency is that fossil fuel pollution is destroying the foundation of Plaintiffs’ lives.”

It’s the same argument from the same people (Our Children’s Trust) that was shot down in flames just a year ago.  There were multiple attempts to undo the damaged legal maneuver to no avail.  Below is why this latest litigation should be put out of its misery at once.

 Appeals Court Rules Against Kids’ Climate Lawsuit, May 1, 2024

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals grants Federal government’s petition for writ of mandamus in the case of Juliana v. United States, originally filed in 2015.  Ruling excerpts are below in italics with my bolds. 20240501_docket-24-684_order

In the underlying case, twenty-one plaintiffs (the Juliana plaintiffs) claim that—by failing to adequately respond to the threat of climate change—the government has violated a putative “right to a stable climate system that can sustain human life.” Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-AA, 2023 WL 9023339, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2023). In a prior appeal, we held that the Juliana plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring such a claim. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). We remanded with instructions to dismiss on that basis. Id. The district court nevertheless allowed amendment, and the government again moved to dismiss. The district court denied that motion, and the government petitioned for mandamus seeking to enforce our earlier mandate. We have jurisdiction to consider the petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651. We grant it.

In the prior appeal, we held that declaratory relief was “not substantially likely to mitigate the plaintiffs’ asserted concrete injuries.” Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1170. To the contrary, it would do nothing “absent further court action,” which we held was unavailable. Id. We then clearly explained that Article III courts could not “step into the shoes” of the political branches to provide the relief the Juliana plaintiffs sought. Id. at 1175. Because neither the request for declaratory relief nor the request for injunctive relief was justiciable, we “remand[ed] th[e] case to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing.” Id. Our mandate was to dismiss.

The district court gave two reasons for allowing amendment. First, it concluded that amendment was not expressly precluded. Second, it held that intervening authority compelled a different result. We reject each.
The first reason fails because we “remand[ed] . . . with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing.” Id. Neither the mandate’s letter nor its spirit left room for amendment. See Pit River Tribe, 615 F.3d at 1079.

The second reason the district court identified was that, in its view, there was an intervening change in the law. District courts are not bound by a mandate when a subsequently decided case changes the law. In re Molasky, 843 F.3d 1179, 1184 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016). The case the court identified was Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, which “ask[ed] whether an award of nominal damages by itself can redress a past injury.” 141 S. Ct. 792, 796 (2021). Thus, Uzuegbunam was a damages case which says nothing about the redressability of declaratory judgments. Damages are a form of retrospective relief. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 608–09 (2001). Declaratory relief is prospective. The Juliana plaintiffs do not seek damages but seek only prospective relief. Nothing in Uzuegbunam changed the law with respect to prospective relief.

We held that the Juliana plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims and told the district court to dismiss. Uzuegbunam did not change that. The district court is instructed to dismiss the case forthwith for lack of Article III standing, without leave to amend.

Background July 2023: Finally, a Legal Rebuttal on the Merits of Kids’ Climate Lawsuit

As reported last month, the Oregon activist judge invited the plaintiffs in Juliana vs US to reopen that case even after the Ninth Circuit shot it down.  Now we have a complete and thorough Motion from the defendant (US government) to dismiss this newest amended complaint.  Most interesting is the section under the heading starting on page 30.  Excerpts in italics with my bolds and added images.

Plaintiffs’ Claims Fail on the Merits

Because Plaintiffs’ action fails at the jurisdictional threshold, the Ninth Circuit never reached—and this Court need not reach—the merits of the claims. . . Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, which supersedes the first amended complaint, asserts the same claims that were brought in the first amended complaint, which this Court addressed in orders that the Ninth Circuit reversed. Defendants thus renew their objection that Plaintiffs’ claims fail on the merits and should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

A. There is no constitutional right to a stable climate system.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed courts considering novel due process claims
to “‘exercise the utmost care whenever . . . asked to break new ground in this field,’… lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed” into judicial policy preferences. More specifically, the Supreme Court has “regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”  Plaintiffs’ request that this Court recognize an implied fundamental right to a stable climate system contradicts that directive, because such a purported right is without basis in the Nation’s history or tradition.

The proposed right to a “stable climate system” is nothing like any fundamental right ever recognized by the Supreme Court. The state of the climate is a public and generalized issue, and so interests in the climate are unlike the particularized personal liberty or personal privacy interests of individuals the Supreme Court has previously recognized as being protected by fundamental rights.  “[W]henever federal courts have faced assertions of fundamental rights to a ‘healthful environment’ or to freedom from harmful contaminants, they have invariably rejected those claims.”. Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief must be dismissed.

B.  Plaintiffs fail to allege a cognizable state-created danger claim.

The First Claim for Relief must also be dismissed because the Constitution does not impose an affirmative duty to protect individuals, and Plaintiffs have failed to allege a cognizable claim under the “state-created danger” exception to that rule.
As a general matter:

[The Due Process Clause] is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without “due process of law,” but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means.

Thus, the Due Process Clause imposes no duty on the government to protect persons from harm inflicted by third parties that would violate due process if inflicted by the government.

Plaintiffs contend that the government’s “deliberate actions” and “deliberate indifference” with regard to the dangers of climate change amount to a due process violation under the state-created danger exception.

First, Plaintiffs have identified no harms to their “personal security or bodily integrity” of the kind and immediacy that qualify for the state-created danger exception. . . But here, Plaintiffs allege that general degradation of the global climate has harmed their “dignity, including their capacity to provide for their basic human needs, safely raise families, practice their religious and spiritual beliefs, [and] maintain their bodily integrity” and has prevented them from “lead[ing] lives with access to clean air, water, shelter, and food.”  Those types of harm are unlike the immediate, direct, physical, and personal harms at issue in the above-cited cases.

Second, Plaintiffs identify no specific government actions—much less government actors—that put them in such danger. Instead, Plaintiffs contend that a number of (mostly unspecified) agency actions and inactions spanning the last several decades have exposed them to harm. This allegation of slowly-recognized, long-incubating, and generalized harm by itself conclusively distinguishes their claim from all other state-created danger cases recognized by the Ninth Circuit.

Third, Plaintiffs do not allege that government actions endangered Plaintiffs in particular. . . As explained above, Plaintiffs’ asserted injuries arise from a diffuse, global phenomenon that affects every other person in their communities, in the United States, and throughout the world.

For all these reasons, there is no basis for finding a violation of Plaintiffs’ due process right under the state-created danger doctrine, and Plaintiffs’ corresponding claim must be dismissed.

C. No federal public trust doctrine creates a right to a stable climate system.

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Claim for Relief, asserting public trust claims, should be dismissed for two independent reasons. First, any public trust doctrine is a creature of state law that applies narrowly and exclusively to particular types of state-owned property not at issue here. That doctrine has no application to federal property, the use and management of which is entrusted exclusively to Congress. . .Consequently, there is no basis for Plaintiffs’ public trust claim against the federal government under federal law.

Second, the “climate system” or atmosphere is not within any conceivable federal public trust.

1. No public trust doctrine binds the federal government.

Plaintiffs rely on an asserted public trust doctrine for the proposition that the federal government must “take affirmative steps to protect” “our country’s life-sustaining climate system,” which they assert the government holds in trust for their benefit.  But because any public trust doctrine is a matter of state law only, public trust claims may not be asserted against the federal government under federal law. . . The Supreme Court has without exception treated public trust doctrine as a matter of state law with no basis in the United States Constitution.

2. Any public trust doctrine would not apply to the “climate system” or the atmosphere.

Independently, any asserted public trust doctrine does not help Plaintiffs here. Public trust cases have historically involved state ownership of specific types of natural resources, usually limited to submerged and submersible lands, tidelands, and waterways. . . The climate system or atmosphere is unlike any resource previously deemed subject to a public trust. It cannot be owned and, due to its ephemeral nature, cannot remain within the jurisdiction of any single government. No court has held that the climate system or atmosphere is protected by a public trust doctrine. Indeed, the concept has been widely rejected.

For all these reasons, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Claim for Relief.

Background Post Update on Zombie Kids Climate Lawsuits: (Juliana vs. US) (Held vs Montana)

Near Normal Arctic Ice End of May 2025

After a sub-par March maximum, in April and now in May 2025, Arctic ice has closed the gap with the 19-year average.

During May the average year loses 1.71 M km2 of ice extent.   MASIE showed 2025 losing slightly more, 1.78 M km2, while SII showed close to average at month end.   Throughout May both MASIE and SII tracked close to the 19 year average with a dipping lower mid month.

The regional distribution of ice extents is shown in the table below.

Region 2025151 Day 151 2025-Ave. 2007151 2025-2007
 (0) Northern_Hemisphere 11641897 11739951 -98055 11846659 -204762
 (1) Beaufort_Sea 1066232 1010120 56112 1059461 6771
 (2) Chukchi_Sea 941331 872869 68462 894617 46714
 (3) East_Siberian_Sea 1074738 1065906 8832 1069198 5540
 (4) Laptev_Sea 779394 828746 -49352 754651 24744
 (5) Kara_Sea 736946 831977 -95031 895678 -158732
 (6) Barents_Sea 291895 315440 -23544 323801 -31906
 (7) Greenland_Sea 670528 584085 86443 591919 78609
 (8) Baffin_Bay_Gulf_of_St._Lawrence 853619 904731 -51112 934257 -80637
 (9) Canadian_Archipelago 843914 812776 31138 818055 25859
 (10) Hudson_Bay 1046462 1081957 -35494 1077744 -31282
 (11) Central_Arctic 3216938 3220915 -3977 3230109.43 -13171
 (12) Bering_Sea 73534 115851 -42316 112352.8 -38819
 (13) Baltic_Sea 0 6015 -6015 0 0
 (14) Sea_of_Okhotsk 44702 175668 -130966 83076 -38375

The table shows  major deficits in the Pacific basins of Okhotsk and Bering combined are 173k km2. On the Atlantic side, Kara and Laptev combined to lose 144k km2.  The other regions are a mix of surpluses and deficits giving an overall result about 100k km2 below average or 0.8%.

Why is this important?  All the claims of global climate emergency depend on dangerously higher  temperatures, lower sea ice, and rising sea levels.  The lack of additional warming prior to 2023 El Nino is documented in a post April 2025 UAH Temps Little Changed For Now.

The lack of acceleration in sea levels along coastlines has been discussed also.  See Observed vs. Imagined Sea Levels 2023 Update

Also, a longer term perspective is informative:

post-glacial_sea_level

Who Knew? Trump Tariffs Good for Environment

Melanie Collette explains a surprising and irgnored result from the trade maneuvers in her Real Clear Energy article Trump’s Tariffs Might Be the Green Policy Nobody Saw Coming.  Excerpts italics with my bolds and added images.

For all the buzz about “going green,” much of the technology touted by the Green Left to move our nation to “Net Zero” — specifically solar panels and EV batteries — comes from places where the sky is choked with smog and rivers run with industrial waste.  And while these same critics often dismiss Donald Trump’s tariffs as economic saber-rattling, in reality, the President’s policies carry significant and underappreciated environmental benefits.

Tariffs are an unlikely ally in the fight against pollution:

♦  They incentivize domestic production;
♦  tighten environmental standards, and
♦  hold foreign manufacturers accountable for environmental negligence.

In a world where environmental goals often live on paper but die in execution, tariffs provide real leverage. They shift incentives in the right direction without depending on lengthy negotiations, uncertain compliance, or idealistic assumptions about global unity.

Tariffs as Environmental Filters

By imposing tariffs on imports from countries with looser environmental regulations, Trump’s trade policy incentivizes companies to manufacture domestically, where environmental protections are stronger and enforcement is more robust. Critics call it economic nationalism, but the reality is more nuanced: the policy functions as an ecological safeguard, reducing reliance on countries like China, which is ranked as the 13th most polluted nation in the world.

China’s dominant production of rare earth elements (REE)
has led to significant environmental degradation.

The Bayan Obo mine, one of the world’s most significant REE sources, has been associated with extensive soil and water pollution. Reports indicate that the mining process yields substantial amounts of waste gas, wastewater, and radioactive residue, contaminating local ecosystems and posing health risks to nearby communities.

And here’s something most people overlook — when manufacturing stays closer to home, it’s easier to track environmental violations and enforce rules. Transparency skyrockets when the EPA, OSHA, and other regulatory agencies are just a phone call away, not an ocean apart.

This diagram shows the origin of the metals required for meeting the 2030 goals. The left side of the diagram shows the origin, based on today’s global production of metals. The right side shows the cumulative metal demand for wind and solar technologies until 2030. From study showing tonnage of Dutch demand only.

Trump’s administration is also leveraging Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act to impose tariffs on foreign processed minerals. The goal? Reduce foreign dependence and revive domestic production of critical materials like rare earth elements, essential for clean tech and defense.

The result is a renewed focus on U.S.-based mining and processing, offering a cleaner, more transparent alternative to China’s pollution-heavy rare earth industry. A stronger domestic rare earths sector is a win for national security and the environment. Environmental accountability increases when these materials are mined and processed under U.S. regulation.

The Dirty Truth Behind “Clean” Tech

Let’s be honest: outsourcing green tech to countries with weak environmental laws doesn’t eliminate emissions, but does outsource them. This phenomenon, known as “pollution leakage,” erodes the benefits we claim to pursue.

While the West celebrates progress in so-called green energy, producing those “eco-friendly” goods is often carried out in developing world factories. More than that, this behavior masks the real cost of green technologies. Products may seem “cheap” to consumers, but their environmental impact — from polluted rivers to toxic waste — remains largely unaccounted for.

Trump’s tariff strategy encourages manufacturers to source from countries with higher environmental standards or bring production back home. Case studies show that reshoring delivers economic and environmental benefits, especially in energy and heavy industry sectors. Cleaner supply chains begin with better accountability, which tariffs are uniquely positioned to provide.

When production happens domestically, enforcing environmental controls, adopting green manufacturing processes, and implementing technological innovations like low-emission machining are easier. However, these advancements are often out of reach for foreign suppliers focused solely on cost-cutting.

Global Environmental Agreements: Big Promises, Weak Results

The mainstream media heralded the Biden administration’s return to multilateral climate agreements like the Paris Accord as ” planet-saving,” but real-world results have been underwhelming. These international frameworks lack enforcement, largely exempt the biggest emitters, and allow countries to manipulate statistics to validate their progress in achieving their commitments.

Trump’s policies emphasize sovereignty, which doesn’t mean ignoring the environment. Using trade policy to reinforce domestic environmental protections proves the two priorities are compatible.  Environmental stewardship doesn’t require surrendering control to global institutions. Sometimes it just requires enforcing the rules at home — and setting an example others can’t ignore.

A Practical Path Forward

As the U.S. continues to navigate complex environmental and economic challenges, tariffs can be part of the solution. President Trump’s tariffs protect jobs and the environment, even if critics fail to notice.

Rather than relying solely on lofty international promises, we should consider practical tools, like tariffs, that create real accountability, cleaner production, and stronger domestic resilience.

In an era of performative climate politics, tariffs might just be the unexpected, effective piece of environmental policy we’ve been missing.

Adios Socialized Energy, Welcome Free Market Energy

tippinsights Editorial Board  explains this critical moment in the power struggle over whether the US will have an Energy Sector controlled by Federal diktats or by Market choices. Their article is Adios, Green New Deal. Welcome, Free-Market Energy Independence.  Excerpts in italics with my bolds and added images.

Trump Dismantles the Green Agenda, Embraces Capitalism,
and Launches America’s New Energy Future.

Buried within the 1,100-page bill recently passed by the House of Representatives—the “One Big, Beautiful Bill” that reflects President Trump’s priorities—are several provisions that, if enacted into law, could return the U.S. energy sector to a more capitalistic model.

President Joe Biden, with strong backing from environmental lobbyists and a last-minute defection from West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin, pushed through the Inflation Reduction Act and the Infrastructure Bill. These measures allocated billions of dollars in federal credits and loan guarantees to favored industries, all under the banner of environmental protection.

What followed was a Soviet-style industrial strategy in which
a handful of Washington bureaucrats determined
the winners and losers of America’s energy future.

The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) 2022 contained “Climate and energy investments” of approximately $369 billion over 10 years. These included $270 billion for clean energy tax credits to support wind, solar, geothermal, and other renewables; clean hydrogen production; and carbon capture and storage technologies. Buyers of electric vehicles would get up to a $7,500 tax credit for new EVs and up to a $4,000 tax credit for used EVs (with income and manufacturing origin restrictions). Tax credits and funding for domestic manufacturing of solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and critical minerals exceeded $60 billion. Rebates for energy-efficient appliance upgrades, heat pumps, insulation, and home weatherization exceeded $60 billion under the Green Jobs and Environmental Justice banner.

With so much federal money up for grabs, greedy entrepreneurs flocked to risky green energy ventures, largely funded by grants and low-interest loans—funding they likely wouldn’t have secured through private markets. We all remember the Obama-era Solyndra disaster, but Biden’s approach was Solyndra-style investment on steroids.

What was worse, Biden used the vast levers of federal power to kneecap perfectly functioning industries. His administration was especially punitive toward the oil and gas sector: it suspended leases on federal land, blocked vast swaths of the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf coasts from new drilling, canceled major pipelines, and imposed regulatory hurdles that made it increasingly difficult for the fossil fuel industry to attract investment capital. As oil prices steadily rose, Biden’s energy strategy relied on tapping the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and urging Saudi Arabia to increase production—an ironic move given his simultaneous efforts to restrict Russian oil exports during the Ukraine war.

President Trump, who campaigned once again on the
“drill, baby, drill” message, has consistently opposed
such government interference in the energy markets.

He has long supported removing regulatory red tape and streamlining the permitting process to allow for increased oil production—lowering domestic prices and boosting exports. In December 2019, under Trump’s administration, the U.S. Energy Information Administration announced that America had become a net exporter of oil for the first time in nearly 60 years.

Biden’s green agenda had another critical flaw: financing. Much of it depended on borrowing from Chinaironically benefiting Chinese companies dominating the very industries Biden sought to boost. Since the launch of China’s “Made in China 2025” initiative, Chinese firms—heavily subsidized by their government—have taken over more than 85% of the global rooftop solar panel market. Battery components for solar installations have even higher Chinese market dominance. In effect, Biden borrowed money from China to finance the growth of Chinese companies that sold solar products to U.S. installers.

The new House bill aims to dismantle this entire framework in one stroke.

♦  It eliminates the trading of green credits between corporations;
♦  revokes low-interest green loans, and
♦  entirely phases out subsidies for renewable energy initiatives.

To those who claim this approach is irresponsible, we pose a simple question: How many more decades should the green energy sector rely on government aid to stay afloat? Sustainable energy and transition projects are essential, but they must prove their viability in the open market—just like oil and gas companies do every day. This is classic Adam Smith-style capitalism: let competition and innovation—not government favoritism—determine success.

Trump also supports nuclear power, one of the cleanest
and most efficient methods of generating electricity.

Critics on the Left often call nuclear energy dangerous, but even the most liberal nations—France, Germany, and Japan—have long depended on it. The only significant U.S. nuclear accident, Three Mile Island in the 1980s, did not result in any deaths. Despite Japan’s vulnerability to natural disasters, it maintained a strong safety record until Fukushima. The U.S., by contrast, is less prone to earthquakes or tsunamis, yet Congress and successive administrations have consistently stymied progress on nuclear energy.

This week, Trump signed an executive order that could clear the way for small-scale nuclear plants to begin operations within the next 18 months. These modern reactors, based on cutting-edge American technology, are far safer than their predecessors and are designed to power small cities or neighborhoods rather than entire states. Every aspect of nuclear energy today—from fuel storage to waste disposal—is light-years ahead of where it was decades ago. It’s a national disgrace that despite having world-class nuclear capabilities—including naval reactors and the world’s second-largest nuclear arsenal—our federal policies have hampered the civilian nuclear industry.

By issuing appropriate permitting waivers, Trump aims to unlock this potential, even if a modest federal investment is necessary to overcome ideological resistance from the Left. Energy independence and security should have been the hallmarks of the Obama and Biden administrations. Instead, they catered to the demands of environmental activists and weakened America’s energy position.

We are glad to say that the Green New Deal is dead.

 

Shifting from Energy Scarcity to Energy Abundance

Prior to the Paris COP in 2015, French scientists debunked the green agenda in a White Paper drawn up by the Société de Calcul Mathématique SA  (Mathematical Modelling Company, Corp.)  The battle against global warming: an absurd, costly and pointless crusade.  The whole document is evidence-based, and on the second point concerning energy, they said this:

Chapter 2: The crusade is costly
Direct aid for industries that are completely unviable (such as photovoltaics and wind turbines) but presented as ‘virtuous’ runs into billions of euros, according to recent reports published by the Cour des Comptes (French Audit Office) in 2013. But the highest cost lies in the principle of ‘energy saving,’ which is presented as especially virtuous. Since no civilization can develop when it is saving energy, ours has stopped developing: France now has more than three million people unemployed — it is the price we have to pay for our virtue….

Finally, the world seems to be waking up to energy realities. The actual transition is away from the green imperative to make energy scarce, replaced by driving energy abundance. Kevin Killough writes, including commentary from Mark Mills of Energy Analystics, in his Just The News article:  World moves away from ‘green gospel of scarcity’ and now embraces ‘energy abundance,’ experts say

“I think we’ve gone from scarcity to abundance — from the green gospel of scarcity and its Trinitarian ESG god — to the promised land of abundance guided by the values of affordability and reliability,” David DesRosiers, conference co-chair of the RealClear Energy Future Forum, said.

In 2019, Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg — then a high-school dropout — was invited to the U.N. Climate Action Summit in New York City. There, she would deliver her famous — or infamous, depending on who you ask — how dare you” speech, to which legacy media responded with overwhelming enthusiasm. Thunberg claimed that we were at the start of a “mass extinction,” and she admonished the world for ignoring the alleged crisis while talking “about money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth.”

What a difference six years can make. Voters elected a president in November who signed an executive order aimed at “unleashing American energy,” and Energy Secretary Chris Wright followed the president’s order with a directive to promote “energy abundance.”

This U-turn in views on energy isn’t limited to a change in administration in the U.S.

In May 2021, the International Energy Agency (IEA), which has been criticized for cheerleading emissions reductions, launched a roadmap to reach net zero by 2050, and IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol told The Guardian that “there will not be a need for new investments in oil and gas fields, or new investments in coal mines.”

At the March CERAWeek energy conference in Houston this year, Birol was calling for more investments in oil and gas.

This shift away from the de-growth fervor that was popular for over a decade was the overriding topic at the RealClear Energy Future Forum Monday. Panels of experts in engineering, data centers, mining, oil and gas, and the electricity grid discussed how this change of views has impacted various aspects of the world’s energy picture.

“I think we’ve gone from scarcity to abundance — from the green gospel of scarcity and its Trinitarian ESG god — to the promised land of abundance guided by the values of affordability and reliability,” David DesRosiers, conference co-chair and founder of the RealClear Foundation, said.

When reality hits

Mark Mills, conference co-chair and director of the National Center for Energy Analytics, discussed the role of increasing energy demand as a result of the growth of data centers and artificial intelligence. While many tech companies, such as Microsoft, embraced net-zero goals, Mills explained that the energy demands of data centers forced companies to contend with the reality that although fashionable in some circles, intermittent wind and solar power are not adequate.

“Eventually, reality rears its ugly head, and we recalibrate around what reality permits,” Mills said.

The IEA last month released an in-depth report on how the demand for electricity will be shaped by AI in the coming years. According to the report, a single data center uses as much electricity as 2 million households. Powering one of these data centers, Mills said, requires as much natural gas every day as a single Space X rocket launch.

“With myriads of data centers planned and announced, this means that lighting up the digital infrastructure will soon have the energy demands equivalent to reliably powering hundreds of millions of households,” Mills said.

Mills said, besides the energy to power these data centers, they will also require an abundance of materials. A skyscraper requires the same amount of materials to build a single giga-scale data center, which is a data center requiring 1 billion watt-hours of electricity every hour — the same amount of power consumed by approximately 1,100 homes in a month.

While some have argued that increased efficiencies will address the demand, Mills pointed out that a single smartphone operating at the energy efficiency of a 1984 computer would use more electricity than an entire city block. More efficiency won’t reduce demand for energy, he explained, it will only increase how much can be done with more energy.

The way the grid works

Energy abundance is not only producing more energy. The supply has to be reliable, the experts at the conference said. A few speakers pointed to the blackouts that gripped Spain and Portugal last month as an example of how dangerous an unreliable energy supply can be. Estimates place the death toll from the one-day event at seven people.

James Robb, CEO of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, said that the exact cause of the event is still under investigation, but there are facts that point to the overreliance on intermittent wind and solar.

At the time of the blackout, Robb said, there was little traditional generation — coal, natural gas, hydroelectric and nuclear — operating. To make wind, solar and battery power work on the grid, it has to go through an inverter, which doesn’t have the spinning inertia of generators powered by traditional sources. Grid operators need to maintain a certain frequency of power, and when there’s a disruption, spinning inertia can absorb some of the frequency changes until things stabilize.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chairman Mark Christie explained inertia as a 100-acre lake 6-inches deep. At one end is a river flowing into the lake, like power generated on the grid. At the other end is a river flowing out of the lake, which is the demand for power. To make the grid work, the water has to be kept 6-inches deep at all times.

“If that lake, at any point, becomes an inch deeper or loses an inch of depth, the lake ceases to operate. That’s the way the grid works. It has to be balanced at all times, and that’s the term frequency,” Christie said.

Robb said there are technologies that create synthetic inertia for wind and solar generators, but these are unproven at scale.

“They’re not without their issues there, and one of the big challenges we always have in the electric grid with any new technology is you can study something in the lab. You can deploy…a pilot [project] on a grid somewhere. But when you try to scale it to the level of the North American grid, which is a terawatt of generation, typically in that translation from pilot to terawatt, we discover things that we don’t understand,” Robb said.

Spain and Portugal Achieve Net Zero Accidently

Holding back

Despite many signs pointing to the overreliance on solar energy on the Iberian Peninsula grid as being the cause of the blackouts, other speakers noted that politics is often holding back more discussion on the problem of intermittency.

“It is very clear that the intermittency of wind and solar had a great deal to do with shutting down the grid, but you cannot admit that if you’re in power in Spain or Portugal. Because there are liabilities,” Terrence Keely, CEO of 1PointSix, LLC, a financial advisory firm, said.

Daniel Yergin, vice chairman of S&P Global, said that between 2022 and 2023, the world’s dependence on fossil fuels was down less than one half of one percent. Yet, he said there were still contradictions coming from leaders. As an example, he pointed to British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer who recently said that Britain would increase emission-reduction efforts to 2050.

“But he also said, ‘Oh, let me be clear with you, oil and gas are going to be in the mix for a long time.’ That really captures the struggle of people, of leaders, to kind of adjust to a reality that’s different from what has been the conventional wisdom,” Yergin said of Starmer.

As with any global shift in thinking on issues, some nations are slow to change — or reject it altogether. But the experts at the forum concluded generally that the so-called energy transition, and the de-growth attitudes that drove it for so long, are losing steam.

Carney Brings Eco-Tyranny to Canada

Issues and Insights Editorial Board warns of Carney’s history of climate diktats in their I & I article Eco-Stalinism in Canada.  Excerpts in italics with my bolds and added images.

Leftist Prime Minister Mark Carney might not be as prissy and preposterous as his predecessor, Justin Trudeau, but he is just as tyrannical. He’s told Canadian companies that there will be penalties for those that don’t conduct business in the way he wants them to. We don’t think he’s building gulags in Nunavut for refusenik executives, but we see the hammer and sickle he’s trying to hide behind his back.

Before he was prime minister, Carney claimed that “climate change is an existential threat” and “we all recognize that,” both of which are untrue, but that’s the way authoritarians operate – the only “truth” or “pravda” is whatever they say it is.

He went on to say that “if you’re taking steps, making investments, coming up with new technologies, changing the way you do business, all in service of reducing and eliminating that threat, you’re creating value” and “are part of the solution.” These companies, Carney promises, will be rewarded for their obedience to the central planners.

But woe be unto those “who are lagging behind and are still part of the problem,” because they will be punished.”

Carney has a history of threatening punishment for companies that don’t conduct business in accordance with his wishes. An October 2019 Manchester Guardian article listed a number of occasions in which he warned that businesses falling behind in the pursuit of net zero emissions “will be punished” and those “that don’t adapt” to the framework laid down by the climate bosses “will go bankrupt without question.”

“Carney has led efforts to address the dangers global heating poses to the financial sector, from increasing extreme weather disasters to a potential fall in asset values such as fossil fuel company valuations as government regulations bite,” said the Guardian.

Mark Carney, former Co-Chair of GFANZ (Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero), accompanied by (from left) Ravi Menon, Loh Boon Chye, and Yuki Yasui, at the Singapore Exchange, for the GFANZ announcement on the formation of its Asia-Pacific (APAC) Network

Carney’s threat of punishment is not the possibility of imprisonment but rather the punishment of investors who will move their capital elsewhere. This happens every day, of course. Investors penalize companies that underperform and mismanage by withholding their capital.

But Carbon Tax Carney‘s menace is backed by the power of the government, and it’s not materially different from the tactics used by Barack Obama, who promised before being elected president that he would use policy to bankrupt coal companies.

Obama’s plan was to charge “a huge sum for all that greenhouse gas that’s being emitted.” Apparently the punishment worked. The coal sector lost more than 49,000 jobs between 2008 and 2012, in part due to “increased regulatory initiatives by the Obama administration,” the Washington Post reported.

Obama’s policies not only “contributed to massive job losses in coal country,” says the Heartland Institute’s Sterling Burnett, but also to “the premature shuttering of vital coal-fired power plants.” They “were a factor in profitable coal companies being forced to file for bankruptcy.” 

After almost a decade of Trudeau, Canadians put another climate crusader at the head of their government rather than Pipeline Pierre Poilievere. Carney won’t save the world, because there is no global warming threat, but he now has the power to put companies out of business if they don’t follow the party line.

Canada becomes less glorious and free almost daily.

 

Maryland Governor: Can’t Afford Climate Virtue Projects

Inside Climate News speaking on the side of Climate Virute reported Moore Vetoes Key Maryland Climate Studies, Reversing Course on Environmental Justice Commitments.  Excerpts in italics with my bolds.

The governor nixed a series of high-profile bills that aimed to study the economic impacts of climate change, energy infrastructure and reparations, leaving advocates questioning his commitment to environmental and racial justice priorities.

Maryland legislators and environmental advocates expressed dismay after Gov. Wes Moore vetoed a series of widely supported climate and environmental study bills last week, actions they believe not only mark a sharp departure from his climate promises, but also reflect a breakdown in communication between the governor and members of his own party in the legislature.

Climate Lemmings

On May 16, Moore vetoed more bills than he had in the past two years combined, including multiple proposals that had passed with strong backing from legislative leadership and key climate coalitions.

The vetoes—affecting studies on climate costs, energy reliability, data center impacts and racial reparations—have left activists and lawmakers questioning whether Moore remains a reliable ally in the fight for climate and racial justice and whether his political calculus may have shifted, placing short-term cost savings above long-term structural reform.

Among the vetoed bills was the Responding to Emergency Needs from Extreme Weather (RENEW) Act of 2025, which would have tasked the comptroller and state agencies with assessing the total cost of greenhouse gas emissions and reporting findings by December 2026. Stripped down from its original version, which proposed financial penalties for fossil fuel companies, the bill was seen as an important step toward documenting climate damages and laying the groundwork for future polluter-pay policies.

The estimated cost of the study was about $500,000, drawn from the state’s Strategic Energy Investment Fund (SEIF)—a dedicated fund supported by penalties utilities paid for failing to meet renewable energy targets. It has ballooned to over $300 million in recent years.

Moore also rejected the Data Center Impact Analysis and Report bill, which called for a collaborative study on the environmental and economic footprint of data center expansion across Maryland. The report, required to be completed by September 2026, was meant to guide future zoning and energy decisions as these power-intensive facilities expand statewide.

In a letter to the Senate and House leadership, Moore stated budget shortage, agency workload and redundancy as key reasons for the vetoes. “Many of these reports are never read and simply collect dust on shelves,” Moore wrote, calling the expected $1.28 million cost “an unsustainable commitment given the state’s current financial constraints.”

Also vetoed was the Energy Resource Adequacy and Planning Act, which would have created a Strategic Energy Planning Office within the Public Service Commission to assess long-term electricity reliability, model resource scenarios and recommend planning strategies. It was designed to help Maryland manage increasing energy demands as the state transitions toward clean power. The office would have released a major report every three years, coordinating with state agencies and collecting public input. The veto stalls forward-thinking energy planning, critics said.

In a separate letter to Senate President Bill Ferguson and House Speaker Adrienne Jones, Moore justified his veto of the Energy Resource Adequacy and Planning Act by citing fiscal constraints and overlaps. He pointed to the estimated annual cost of $4.4 million to $5.3 million, warning it would duplicate efforts and pass costs on to consumers. “This cost would ultimately be passed along to Maryland ratepayers at a time when we are actively working to limit their burden, not add to it,” he wrote.

“This veto is extremely frustrating and simply does not support the state’s climate goals.”

— Kim Coble, Maryland League of Conservation Voters

April 2025 Two Years Ocean Warming Gone

The best context for understanding decadal temperature changes comes from the world’s sea surface temperatures (SST), for several reasons:

  • The ocean covers 71% of the globe and drives average temperatures;
  • SSTs have a constant water content, (unlike air temperatures), so give a better reading of heat content variations;
  • A major El Nino was the dominant climate feature in recent years.

HadSST is generally regarded as the best of the global SST data sets, and so the temperature story here comes from that source. Previously I used HadSST3 for these reports, but Hadley Centre has made HadSST4 the priority, and v.3 will no longer be updated.  HadSST4 is the same as v.3, except that the older data from ship water intake was re-estimated to be generally lower temperatures than shown in v.3.  The effect is that v.4 has lower average anomalies for the baseline period 1961-1990, thereby showing higher current anomalies than v.3. This analysis concerns more recent time periods and depends on very similar differentials as those from v.3 despite higher absolute anomaly values in v.4.  More on what distinguishes HadSST3 and 4 from other SST products at the end. The user guide for the current version HadSST4.1.1.0 is here.   The charts and analysis below is produced from the current data.

The Current Context

The chart below shows SST monthly anomalies as reported in HadSST4 starting in 2015 through April 2025. A global cooling pattern is seen clearly in the Tropics since its peak in 2016, joined by NH and SH cycling downward since 2016, followed by rising temperatures in 2023 and 2024.

Note that in 2015-2016 the Tropics and SH peaked in between two summer NH spikes.  That pattern repeated in 2019-2020 with a lesser Tropics peak and SH bump, but with higher NH spikes. By end of 2020, cooler SSTs in all regions took the Global anomaly well below the mean for this period.  A small warming was driven by NH summer peaks in 2021-22, but offset by cooling in SH and the tropics, By January 2023 the global anomaly was again below the mean.

Then in 2023-24 came an event resembling 2015-16 with a Tropical spike and two NH spikes alongside, all higher than 2015-16. There was also a coinciding rise in SH, and the Global anomaly was pulled up to 1.1°C last year, ~0.3° higher than the 2015 peak.  Then NH started down autumn 2023, followed by Tropics and SH descending 2024 to the present. After 12 months of cooling in SH and the Tropics, the Global anomaly came back down, led by NH cooling the last 8 months from its 1.3C peak in August, down to 0.8C in March and April. With some recent warming in the Tropics and SH, all regions are now close together nearly at the global anomaly, less than 0.1C higher than the average for this period.

Remarkably, April 2025 SST anomalies in all regions and globally are the coolest since March 2023.

Comment:

The climatists have seized on this unusual warming as proof their Zero Carbon agenda is needed, without addressing how impossible it would be for CO2 warming the air to raise ocean temperatures.  It is the ocean that warms the air, not the other way around.  Recently Steven Koonin had this to say about the phonomenon confirmed in the graph above:

El Nino is a phenomenon in the climate system that happens once every four or five years.  Heat builds up in the equatorial Pacific to the west of Indonesia and so on.  Then when enough of it builds up it surges across the Pacific and changes the currents and the winds.  As it surges toward South America it was discovered and named in the 19th century  It iswell understood at this point that the phenomenon has nothing to do with CO2.

Now people talk about changes in that phenomena as a result of CO2 but it’s there in the climate system already and when it happens it influences weather all over the world.   We feel it when it gets rainier in Southern California for example.  So for the last 3 years we have been in the opposite of an El Nino, a La Nina, part of the reason people think the West Coast has been in drought.

It has now shifted in the last months to an El Nino condition that warms the globe and is thought to contribute to this Spike we have seen. But there are other contributions as well.  One of the most surprising ones is that back in January of 2022 an enormous underwater volcano went off in Tonga and it put up a lot of water vapor into the upper atmosphere. It increased the upper atmosphere of water vapor by about 10 percent, and that’s a warming effect, and it may be that is contributing to why the spike is so high.

A longer view of SSTs

The graph below  is noisy, but the density is needed to see the seasonal patterns in the oceanic fluctuations.  Previous posts focused on the rise and fall of the last El Nino starting in 2015.  This post adds a longer view, encompassing the significant 1998 El Nino and since.  The color schemes are retained for Global, Tropics, NH and SH anomalies.  Despite the longer time frame, I have kept the monthly data (rather than yearly averages) because of interesting shifts between January and July.

To enlarge image, open in new tab.

The graph above is noisy, but the density is needed to see the seasonal patterns in the oceanic fluctuations.  Previous posts focused on the rise and fall of the last El Nino starting in 2015.  This post adds a longer view, encompassing the significant 1998 El Nino and since.  The color schemes are retained for Global, Tropics, NH and SH anomalies.  Despite the longer time frame, I have kept the monthly data (rather than yearly averages) because of interesting shifts between January and July. 1995 is a reasonable (ENSO neutral) starting point prior to the first El Nino.

The sharp Tropical rise peaking in 1998 is dominant in the record, starting Jan. ’97 to pull up SSTs uniformly before returning to the same level Jan. ’99. There were strong cool periods before and after the 1998 El Nino event. Then SSTs in all regions returned to the mean in 2001-2.

SSTS fluctuate around the mean until 2007, when another, smaller ENSO event occurs. There is cooling 2007-8,  a lower peak warming in 2009-10, following by cooling in 2011-12.  Again SSTs are average 2013-14.

Now a different pattern appears.  The Tropics cooled sharply to Jan 11, then rise steadily for 4 years to Jan 15, at which point the most recent major El Nino takes off.  But this time in contrast to ’97-’99, the Northern Hemisphere produces peaks every summer pulling up the Global average.  In fact, these NH peaks appear every July starting in 2003, growing stronger to produce 3 massive highs in 2014, 15 and 16.  NH July 2017 was only slightly lower, and a fifth NH peak still lower in Sept. 2018.

The highest summer NH peaks came in 2019 and 2020, only this time the Tropics and SH were offsetting rather adding to the warming. (Note: these are high anomalies on top of the highest absolute temps in the NH.)  Since 2014 SH has played a moderating role, offsetting the NH warming pulses. After September 2020 temps dropped off down until February 2021.  In 2021-22 there were again summer NH spikes, but in 2022 moderated first by cooling Tropics and SH SSTs, then in October to January 2023 by deeper cooling in NH and Tropics.

Then in 2023 the Tropics flipped from below to well above average, while NH produced a summer peak extending into September higher than any previous year.  Despite El Nino driving the Tropics January 2024 anomaly higher than 1998 and 2016 peaks, following months cooled in all regions, and the Tropics continued cooling in April, May and June along with SH dropping.  After July and August NH warming again pulled the global anomaly higher, September through January 2025 resumed cooling in all regions, continuing February through April 2025.

What to make of all this? The patterns suggest that in addition to El Ninos in the Pacific driving the Tropic SSTs, something else is going on in the NH.  The obvious culprit is the North Atlantic, since I have seen this sort of pulsing before.  After reading some papers by David Dilley, I confirmed his observation of Atlantic pulses into the Arctic every 8 to 10 years.

Contemporary AMO Observations

Through January 2023 I depended on the Kaplan AMO Index (not smoothed, not detrended) for N. Atlantic observations. But it is no longer being updated, and NOAA says they don’t know its future.  So I find that ERSSTv5 AMO dataset has current data.  It differs from Kaplan, which reported average absolute temps measured in N. Atlantic.  “ERSST5 AMO  follows Trenberth and Shea (2006) proposal to use the NA region EQ-60°N, 0°-80°W and subtract the global rise of SST 60°S-60°N to obtain a measure of the internal variability, arguing that the effect of external forcing on the North Atlantic should be similar to the effect on the other oceans.”  So the values represent SST anomaly differences between the N. Atlantic and the Global ocean.

The chart above confirms what Kaplan also showed.  As August is the hottest month for the N. Atlantic, its variability, high and low, drives the annual results for this basin.  Note also the peaks in 2010, lows after 2014, and a rise in 2021. Then in 2023 the peak was holding at 1.4C before declining.  An annual chart below is informative:

 

Note the difference between blue/green years, beige/brown, and purple/red years.  2010, 2021, 2022 all peaked strongly in August or September.  1998 and 2007 were mildly warm.  2016 and 2018 were matching or cooler than the global average.  2023 started out slightly warm, then rose steadily to an  extraordinary peak in July.  August to October were only slightly lower, but by December cooled by ~0.4C.

Then in 2024 the AMO anomaly started higher than any previous year, then leveled off for two months declining slightly into April.  Remarkably, May showed an upward leap putting this on a higher track than 2023, and rising slightly higher in June.  In July, August and September 2024 the anomaly declined, and despite a small rise in October, ended close to where it began.  Note 2025 started much lower than the previous year and is headed sharply downward, well below the previous two years.

The pattern suggests the ocean may be demonstrating a stairstep pattern like that we have also seen in HadCRUT4.

The purple line is the average anomaly 1980-1996 inclusive, value 0.17.  The orange line the average 1980-2024, value 0.38, also for the period 1997-2012. The red line is 2013-2024, value 0.67. As noted above, these rising stages are driven by the combined warming in the Tropics and NH, including both Pacific and Atlantic basins.

Curiosity:  Solar Coincidence?

The news about our current solar cycle 25 is that the solar activity is hitting peak numbers now and higher  than expected 1-2 years in the future.  As livescience put it:  Solar maximum could hit us harder and sooner than we thought. How dangerous will the sun’s chaotic peak be?  Some charts from spaceweatherlive look familar to these sea surface temperature charts.

Summary

The oceans are driving the warming this century.  SSTs took a step up with the 1998 El Nino and have stayed there with help from the North Atlantic, and more recently the Pacific northern “Blob.”  The ocean surfaces are releasing a lot of energy, warming the air, but eventually will have a cooling effect.  The decline after 1937 was rapid by comparison, so one wonders: How long can the oceans keep this up? And is the sun adding forcing to this process?

Footnote: Why Rely on HadSST4

HadSST is distinguished from other SST products because HadCRU (Hadley Climatic Research Unit) does not engage in SST interpolation, i.e. infilling estimated anomalies into grid cells lacking sufficient sampling in a given month. From reading the documentation and from queries to Met Office, this is their procedure.

HadSST4 imports data from gridcells containing ocean, excluding land cells. From past records, they have calculated daily and monthly average readings for each grid cell for the period 1961 to 1990. Those temperatures form the baseline from which anomalies are calculated.

In a given month, each gridcell with sufficient sampling is averaged for the month and then the baseline value for that cell and that month is subtracted, resulting in the monthly anomaly for that cell. All cells with monthly anomalies are averaged to produce global, hemispheric and tropical anomalies for the month, based on the cells in those locations. For example, Tropics averages include ocean grid cells lying between latitudes 20N and 20S.

Gridcells lacking sufficient sampling that month are left out of the averaging, and the uncertainty from such missing data is estimated. IMO that is more reasonable than inventing data to infill. And it seems that the Global Drifter Array displayed in the top image is providing more uniform coverage of the oceans than in the past.

uss-pearl-harbor-deploys-global-drifter-buoys-in-pacific-ocean

USS Pearl Harbor deploys Global Drifter Buoys in Pacific Ocean

IPCC Climate Models Proven to Lack Predictive Ability

The recently published paper is Are Climate Model Forecasts Useful for Policy Making? by Kesten C. Green and Willie Soon. Excerpts in italics with my bolds and added images.

Effect of Variable Choice on Reliability and Predictive Validity

Abstract

For a model to be useful for policy decisions, statistical fit is insufficient. Evidence that the model provides out-of-estimation-sample forecasts that are more accurate and reliable than those from plausible alternative models, including a simple benchmark, is necessary.

The UN’s IPCC advises governments with forecasts of global average temperature drawn from models based on hypotheses of causality. Specifically, manmade warming principally from carbon dioxide emissions  (Anthro) tempered by the effects of volcanic eruptions (Volcanic) and by variations in the  Sun’s energy (Solar). Out-of-sample forecasts from that model, with and without the IPCC’s favoured measure of Solar, were compared with forecasts from models that excluded human influence and included Volcanic and one of two independent measures of Solar. The models were used to forecast Northern Hemisphere land temperatures and—to avoid urban heat island effects—rural only temperatures. Benchmark forecasts were obtained by extrapolating estimation sample median temperatures.

The independent solar models reduced forecast errors relative to those of the benchmark model for all eight combinations of four estimation periods and the two temperature variables tested. The models that included the IPCC’s Anthro variable reduced errors for only three of the eight combinations and produced extreme forecast errors from most model estimation periods. The correlation between estimation sample statistical fit and forecast accuracy was -0.26. Further tests might identify better models: Only one extrapolation model and only two of many possible independent solar models were tested, and combinations of forecasts from different methods were not examined.

The anthropogenic models’ unreliability would appear to void policy relevance. In practice, even the models validated in this study may fail to improve accuracy relative to naïve forecasts due to uncertainty over the future causal variable values. Our findings emphasize that out-of-sample forecast errors, not statistical fit, should be used to choose between models (hypotheses).

Background

In their attempts to achieve the IPCC objective of identifying a human cause for temperature changes—specifically “global warming”—the IPCC researchers have framed the problem as one of “attributing” changes in the Earth’s temperature to the respective contributions of putative anthropogenic (“Anthro”) principally carbon dioxide emissions altering the composition of the atmosphere—and natural influences—principally aerosols from volcanic eruptions altering the composition of the atmosphere (“Volcanic”), and total solar irradiance, or TSI, variations (“Solar”).

Given the task they were set, the IPCC researchers have devoted
much of their efforts into developing estimates of the Anthro variable.

The IPCC’s most recent, AR6, report (IPCC, 2021) only considered one estimate of Solar for the purpose of attribution (Matthes et al., 2017) and made no allowance for the effect of urban heat islands on the temperature measures they used (Connolly et al., 2021, 2023; Soon et al., 2023). Moreover, a study of the statistical attribution or “fingerprinting” approach used by IPCC researchers (e.g., Allen and Tett, 1999; Hasselmann, et al., 1995; Hegerl et al., 1997; Santer et al.,1995) concluded that the approach was invalid (McKitrick, 2022). The IPCC authors’ analyses failed to meet the assumptions of the method they used, and they failed to correctly implement the method.

In sum, the objective given to the IPCC researchers and the approach that they have taken suggests that plausible alternative hypotheses on the causes of terrestrial temperature changes may not have been adequately tested, as is required by the scientific method (Armstrong and Green, 2022). That concern is consistent with Armstrong and Green’s (2022) observation that government sponsorship of research can create incentives that may influence researchers’ choices of hypotheses to test and how they test them.

1.1 Alternative hypotheses on Solar

To address the first of the foregoing limitations in the IPCC attribution studies—failure to fairly test alternative TSI estimates—Connolly et al. (2021, 2023) comprehensively reviewed alternative estimates of TSI covering the 169 years from 1850 to 2018. In addition to the Matthes, et al. (2017) TSI estimates series used by the IPCC (2021)—henceforth “IPCC Solar”—Connolly et al. (2023) identified 27 alternative Solar time series.

The alternative estimates of Solar correlate quite well with the TSI used in the AR6 report—Pearson’s r values range between 0.39 and 0.97 with a median of 0.82—but the degree of TSI variation in Watts per square metre (Wm-2) differs considerably between the estimates. The ranges of the individual alternative TSI estimate series vary between 0.49 and 4.64 Wm-2, with a median range of 1.77 Wm-2, while IPCC Solar has a range of only 0.19 Wm-2.

In this study, we consider two plausible TSI reconstructions from Connolly et al. (2023). Those from Hoyt and Schatten (1993) and from Bard et al. (2000), which Connolly et al. (2023) updated to the year 20182. The former TSI record (“H1993 Solar”) was based on the so-called multiproxy—i.e., equatorial solar rotation rate, sunspot structure, the decay rate of individual sunspots, the number of sunspots without umbrae, and the length and decay rate of the 11-yr sunspot activity cycle—reconstruction of the solar irradiance history.

1.2 Alternative hypotheses on temperature estimation

The IPCC’s attribution studies do not account for the direct effects of human activities on local temperatures (heat islands)—the second weakness addressed in this study. For example, heating and cooling of building interiors, electricity generation, manufacturing, freight and transport, asphalt and concrete, and where vegetation and open water have been removed or added. Where temperature readings are taken close to such human sources of heat or absence of natural cooling, they cannot properly reflect the individual effects of human emissions of carbon dioxide, etc., that the IPCC are concerned about (their Anthro variable), the Volcanic variable, and TSI.

To address this second limitation in the IPCC attribution studies, Connolly et al. (2021, 2023) developed four alternative estimates of surface temperatures that were intended to avoid heat island effects. They were based on rural only weather station readings, sea surface temperature readings, tree-ring width measurements, and glacier length measurements. For comparison with the approach used by the IPCC, they also developed an all-land temperature estimates series for the Northern Hemisphere.

1.5 Hypotheses tested

The foregoing discussion suggests the following hypotheses, which are tested in this study.

    • H1. Forecasts from causal models will [will not] be usefully more accurate than forecasts from a naïve no-change model.
    • H2. Models using variable measures developed independently of the IPCC dangerous manmade global warming hypothesis will [will not] have greater predictive validity.
    • H3. The statistical fit of the models (adjusted-R2) will not [will] be substantively positively related to their predictive validity.
    • H4. Models using variable measures developed independently of the IPCC dangerous manmade global warming hypothesis will [will not] be more reliable.

Findings

Figure 1: Absolute Errors of NH All Land and Rural Land Temperature Forecasts to 2018 (℃) — Forecasts from four alternative models plus naïve estimates over four periods. Legend (Causal variables in models):    Black Anthro, Volcanic; Red Anthro, Volcanic, IPCC Solar;  Green B2000 Solar, Volcanic;  Blue H1993 Solar, Volcanic; Yellow Estimation sample median temperature.

3.1 Predictive validity of causal models versus naïve model [H1]

Forecast errors were larger than the benchmark errors (UMBRAE) for the IPCC Anthro models AVL and AVSL estimated with data from 1850 to 1949 and from 1850 to 1969, and for the AVR and AVSR models estimated with data from 1850 to 1899, 1850 to 1949, and 1850 to 1969. The anthropogenic warming models showed predictive validity relative the naïve model (UMBRAE less than 1.0) for only three of the eight combinations of forecast variable and estimation sample period.

3.2 Predictive validity of independent versus IPCC models [H2]

The MdAEs (median absolute error) of the forecasts from the models with IPCC’s anthropogenic and volcanic series as causal variables (AVL and AVR) and from the models that also included IPCC’s solar series (AVSL and AVSR) were greater than 1°C (roughly 2°F) for five of the eight combinations tested. The MdAEs of the forecasts from the models with B2000 solar and the volcanic series as causal variables (SBVL and SBVR) were less than 0.55°C (1°F) for all eight of the estimation periods used and temperature series being forecast combinations and for seven of the eight in the case of the models with H1993 as the solar variable (SHVL and SHVR).

3.3 Relationship between predictive validity and statistical fit of models [H3]

The correlations (sign-reversed Pearson’s r) between the accuracy of out-of-sample forecasts, as measured by UMBRAE (an error measure, hence the sign reversal), and the statistical fit of the models to the estimation data (adjusted-R2) for the causal models tested were large and negative for six (6) of the eight (8) combinations of estimation period (1850 to 1899, 1949, 1969, and 1999) used—and hence maximum forecast horizon of 119, 69, 49, and 19 years, respectively—and temperature series (NH Land and NH Rural) forecast.

3.4 Reliability of independent versus IPCC models [H4]

Charts of the results of Test 2 are presented in Figure 2 and are discussed below.

Figure 2. Median absolute errors of NH temperature forecasts 2000 to 2018 in ℃. Legend (Causal variables in models): Black Anthro, Volcanic; Red Anthro, Volcanic, IPCC Solar;  Green B2000 Solar, Volcanic;  Blue H1993 Solar, Volcanic;  Yellow Estimation sample median temperature.

The independent solar models—SBVL and SHVL, and SBVR and SHVR—perform largely as one
would expect of causal models when forecasting using known values of the causal variables.

In the case of the AVR and AVSR models—forecasting the rural land temperatures, on the right of Figure 2—the MdAEs decreased rapidly from roughly 17 times the corresponding naïve forecast errors to beat the naïve MdAE when the 76th observation (1925) was added to the estimation samples. After that observation was added, the MdAEs for the AVR and AVSR model forecasts increased rapidly with each extra observation then stayed high before rapidly declining again after the 116th observation (1965) was added to the estimation samples.

When a model of causal relationships is estimated from empirical data on valid causal variables reliably measured, one would expect forecast errors to get smaller as more observations are used in the estimation of the model’s parameters. That is what the charts in Figure 2 show in the case of the naïve benchmark model forecasts and, broadly, what can be seen in the case of the independent models SBVL, SHVL, SBVR, and SHVR, but is not seen in the case of the models using the IPCC variables: AVL, AVSL, AVR, and AVSR.

The errors of the Anthro models’ forecast errors explode well beyond 1 °C and the benchmark model errors for forecast years beyond the mid-1970s, with puzzling exceptions. Namely, forecasts from Anthro models estimated from the largest sample size in the chart—1850 to 1999—and from models estimated from the smallest sample—1850 to 1899—forecasting All Land temperatures. In those cases, involving three of the eight charts, the Anthro model errors are less than the median historical temperature benchmark model errors, and mostly less than the errors of the independent models in later years.

The explosion in Anthro model errors from the 1970s is more extreme for models estimated to forecast Rural Land temperatures. Moreover, for the models estimated using only 1850 to 1899 data, errors are larger than those of the benchmark and independent models from 1920 and, prior to 1970, without any obvious pattern.

5. Conclusions

The IPCC’s models of anthropogenic climate change lack predictive validity. The IPCC models’ forecast errors were greater for most estimation samples —often many times greater—than those from a benchmark model that simply predicts that future years’ temperatures will be the same as the historical median. The size of the forecast errors and unreliability of the models’ forecasts in response to additional observations in the estimation sample implies that the anthropogenic models fail to realistically capture and represent the causes of Earth’s surface temperature changes. In practice, the IPCC models’ relative forecast errors would be still greater due to the uncertainty in forecasting the models’ causal variables, particularly Volcanic and IPCC Solar.

The independent solar models of climate change—which did not include a variable representing the IPCC postulated anthropogenic influence—do have predictive validity. The models reduced errors of forecasts for the years 2000 to 2018 relative to the benchmark errors for all, and all but one of 101 estimation samples tested for each of the two models. One of the models (B2000 Solar) reduced errors by more than 75 percent for forecasts from models estimated from 35 of the samples—a particularly impressive improvement given that the benchmark errors were no greater than 1 °C for all but one of the estimation samples.

The independent solar models provide realistic representations of the causal relationships with surface temperatures. The question of whether the independent solar variables can be forecast with sufficient accuracy to improve on the benchmark model forecasts in practice, however, remains relevant. All in all, and contra to the IPCC reports, there is insufficient evidential basis for the use of carbon dioxide, et cetera, emissions—taken together, the IPCC’s Anthro—as climate policy variables.

Finally, this study provides further evidence that measures of statistical fit provide misinformation about predictive validity. Predictive validity can only be properly estimated when the proposed model or hypothesis is used for forecasting new-to-the-model data, and the forecasts are then compared for accuracy against forecasts from a plausible benchmark model. This important conclusion needs bearing in mind when evaluating policy models.

See Also:

Lacking Data, Climate Models Rely on Guesses

Figure 1. Anthropgenic and natural contributions. (a) Locked scaling factors,
weak Pre Industrial Climate Anomalies (PCA). (b) Free scaling, strong PCA

Climate Models Hide the Paleo Incline