Arctic Ice Aplenty Nov. 30, 2021

The animation shows Arctic ice extents from day 304 (end of October) to day 334, Nov.30, 2021. On the right side are the Euro-Russian seas already frozen over end of October.  At the bottom right Kara Sea fills in to >90%, while Barents (left of Kara) adds nearly 400k km2 to reach 60% of March maximum. Dramatically, at the top center Chukchi freezes over and Bering Sea grows ~300k km2 of ice extent.  On the far left Hudson Bay shows its delayed freezing this year, with some western shore ice appearing only in the last 10 days. Meanwhile, Baffin Bay (lower left) added 480k km2 of ice extent.  The graph below shows November daily ice extents for 2021 compared to 14 year averages, and some years of note.

The black line shows during November on average Arctic ice extents increase ~2.5M km2 from ~8.5M km2 up to ~11M km2.  The 2021 cyan MASIE line started the month 163k km2 above average and on day 334 showed a surplus of  196k km2.  The Sea Ice Index in orange (SII from NOAA) started with the same deficit, then lagged behind through the month, before ending ~200k km2 lower than MASIE. (No SII data yet for day 334). 2019 and 2020 were well below average at this stage of the ice recovery.

Why is this important?  All the claims of global climate emergency depend on dangerously higher temperatures, lower sea ice, and rising sea levels.  The lack of additional warming is documented in a post Adios, Global Warming

The lack of acceleration in sea levels along coastlines has been discussed also.  See USCS Warnings of Coastal Flooding

Also, a longer term perspective is informative:

post-glacial_sea_levelThe table below shows the distribution of Sea Ice on day 334 across the Arctic Regions, on average, this year and 2020.

Region 2021334 Day 334 Average 2021-Ave. 2020334 2021-2020
 (0) Northern_Hemisphere 11171831 10976208 195623 10207244 964587
 (1) Beaufort_Sea 1070776 1069252 1524 1070689 87
 (2) Chukchi_Sea 966006 781701 184305 601423 364584
 (3) East_Siberian_Sea 1087085 1082808 4277 1075464 11621
 (4) Laptev_Sea 897827 897818 9 897827 0
 (5) Kara_Sea 874105 789034 85071 470654 403451
 (6) Barents_Sea 445466 252273 193193 56772 388695
 (7) Greenland_Sea 468845 543650 -74805 577314 -108469
 (8) Baffin_Bay_Gulf_of_St._Lawrence 606454 680452 -73998 608255 -1802
 (9) Canadian_Archipelago 854668 853089 1579 854597 71
 (10) Hudson_Bay 307719 615274 -307555 803363 -495644
 (11) Central_Arctic 3208675 3195024 13651 3118738 89936
 (12) Bering_Sea 335645 140327 195318 39284 296361
 (13) Baltic_Sea 6666 3698 2969 0 6666
 (14) Sea_of_Okhotsk 34960 67733 -32773 31397 3563

The overall surplus to average is 196k km2, (2%).  Note the large surpluses of ice in Chukchi and Bering Seas, partly offset by deficits in Greenland Sea and Baffin bay. The largest deficit is Hudson Bay, a shallow basin that should freeze over in coming weeks, adding nearly 1M km2 when it does. Note that 2021 ice extent exceeds that of 2020 by almost a full Wadham, 965k km2, most of the surplus being in Chukchi, Bering, Kara and Barents Seas.

bathymetric_map_arctic_ocean

Illustration by Eleanor Lutz shows Earth’s seasonal climate changes. If played in full screen, the four corners present views from top, bottom and sides. It is a visual representation of scientific datasets measuring Arctic ice extents.

Arctic Ice Exceeds 10 Wadhams Mid. Nov. 2021

 

Arctic Ice Extent reaching 10 million km2 is a milestone marking recovery of half the ice lost last spring and summer.  Each year the max extent is ~15M km2 and the mid-September min is ~5M km2.  This year in just two months the ice gained back half the ice lost in the six months prior to mid September.  The metric 1 Wadham = 1Mkm2 ice extent is in recognition of the professor who declared the Arctic would be ice-free before 2011, by which he meant less than 1M km2 extent.

The animation shows Arctic ice extents this year for the last two weeks, from day 304 (Oct. 31) to day 319 (Nov. 15). Note on the right side, the Russian shelf seas (from top:  East Siberian, Laptev, Kara) were already ice covered.  At top center, Chukchi adds 200k km2 to reach 90% of max last March. Top left, Beaufort sea fills in to 98% of its March max. Center left is Canadian Arctic Archipelago adding 267k km2 to reach 96% of its max. Lower left shows Baffin Bay and Gulf of St. Lawrence adding 400k km2 up to 67% of its max. .At the bottom center Barents Sea grows 231k km2 to reach 63% of its max.

The graph below shows Oct./Nov. daily ice extents for 2021 compared to 14 year averages, and some years of note:

The black line shows during this period on average Arctic ice extents increase ~3.5M km2 from ~6.3M km2 up to ~9.8M km2.  The 2021 cyan MASIE line started the period ~400k km2 above average and on day 319 retained a surplus of ~380k km2.  The Sea Ice Index in orange (SII from NOAA) started with the same deficit, then lagged behind in the first two weeks, before ending ~200k km2 lower than MASIE (no data yet for yesterday). 2019 and 2020 were well below average at this stage of the ice recovery.

Why is this important?  All the claims of global climate emergency depend on dangerously higher temperatures, lower sea ice, and rising sea levels.  The lack of additional warming is documented in a post Adios, Global Warming

The lack of acceleration in sea levels along coastlines has been discussed also.  See USCS Warnings of Coastal Flooding

Also, a longer term perspective is informative:

post-glacial_sea_levelThe table below shows the distribution of Sea Ice on day 304 across the Arctic Regions, on average, this year and 2020.

Region 2021319 Day 319 Average 2021-Ave. 2020319 2021-2020
 (0) Northern_Hemisphere 10136298 9754986 381313 9171330 964968
 (1) Beaufort_Sea 1052365 1064248 -11883 1068490 -16125
 (2) Chukchi_Sea 868672 614315 254357 539677 328995
 (3) East_Siberian_Sea 1087137 1073635 13503 1078789 8349
 (4) Laptev_Sea 897827 897084 743 889358 8468
 (5) Kara_Sea 711109 637483 73626 450888 260220
 (6) Barents_Sea 286732 145188 141544 15590 271142
 (7) Greenland_Sea 404108 466229 -62120 502768 -98659
 (8) Baffin_Bay_Gulf_of_St._Lawrence 511295 532632 -21337 446719 64575
 (9) Canadian_Archipelago 824385 852284 -27899 854597 -30212
 (10) Hudson_Bay 155801 248736 -92935 256849 -101047
 (11) Central_Arctic 3216117 3168700 47417 3046118 169999

The overall surplus to average is 381k km2, (4%).  Note large surpluses of ice in Chukchi, Barents and Kara Seas, as well as Central Arctic. The main deficits to average are in Greenland Sea and Hudson Bay, the latter being a shallow basin that will freeze over quickly once it starts.  Note that 2021 ice extent exceeds that of 2020 by nearly a full Wadham,  most of the difference being in Chukchi, Kara, Barents and Central Arctic.

bathymetric_map_arctic_ocean

Illustration by Eleanor Lutz shows Earth’s seasonal climate changes. If played in full screen, the four corners present views from top, bottom and sides. It is a visual representation of scientific datasets measuring Arctic ice extents.

Arctic Ice Abounds October 2021

 

The animation shows Arctic ice extents on day 304 (end of October) for the years 2012 through yesterday 2021.  Note the variability from year to year on the CanAm (left side) with the Beaufort Sea at the top, Canadian Archipelago center left, and Baffin Bay, lower left between Greenland and Newfoundland. More noticeable are the Russian shelf seas fluctuations on the right side.  Some years, like 2020, there is still open water, but this year those seas are frozen over, including from the top Chukchi, East Siberian, Laptev, and Kara Seas down to bottom right.

The graph below shows October daily ice extents for 2021 compared to 14 year averages, and some years of note.

The black line shows during October on average Arctic ice extents increase ~3.4M km2 from ~4.9M km2 up to ~8.3M km2.  The 2021 cyan MASIE line started the month ~500k km2 above average and on day 304 retained a surplus of ~160k km2.  The Sea Ice Index in orange (SII from NOAA) started with the same deficit, then lagged behind in the last two weeks, before ending ~100k km2 lower than MASIE. 2019 and 2020 were well below average at this stage of the ice recovery.

Why is this important?  All the claims of global climate emergency depend on dangerously higher temperatures, lower sea ice, and rising sea levels.  The lack of additional warming is documented in a post Adios, Global Warming

The lack of acceleration in sea levels along coastlines has been discussed also.  See USCS Warnings of Coastal Flooding

Also, a longer term perspective is informative:

post-glacial_sea_levelThe table below shows the distribution of Sea Ice on day 304 across the Arctic Regions, on average, this year and 2020.

Region 2021304 Day 304 Average 2021-Ave. 2020304 2021-2020
 (0) Northern_Hemisphere 8528046 8369146 158900 6954249 1573797
 (1) Beaufort_Sea 982244 946489 35755 1044967 -62723
 (2) Chukchi_Sea 659384 436299 223085 369981 289403
 (3) East_Siberian_Sea 1086959 909416 177543 373761 713197
 (4) Laptev_Sea 894716 831110 63606 283776 610940
 (5) Kara_Sea 626536 444754 181781 269583 356952
 (6) Barents_Sea 55711 77133 -21422 14206 41505
 (7) Greenland_Sea 360759 415579 -54820 463525 -102766
 (8) Baffin_Bay_Gulf_of_St._Lawrence 107176 269121 -161945 232788 -125611
 (9) Canadian_Archipelago 557042 788762 -231720 802238 -245196
 (10) Hudson_Bay 5061 82352 -77292 73773 -68712
 (11) Central_Arctic 3160959 3158164 2794 3023876 137083

The overall surplus to average is 159k km2, (2%).  Note large surpluses of ice in BCE (Beaufort, Chukchi and East Siberian seas).  as well as in Laptev and Kara on the Russian coast. The main deficits to average are in Baffin Bay and CAA, more than offset by surpluses elsewhere. Note that 2021 ice extent exceeds that of 2020 by 1.6M km2, most of the difference being in East Siberian, Laptev and Kara Seas.

bathymetric_map_arctic_ocean

Illustration by Eleanor Lutz shows Earth’s seasonal climate changes. If played in full screen, the four corners present views from top, bottom and sides. It is a visual representation of scientific datasets measuring Arctic ice extents.

Covid/Climate Tyranny: Two sides of same Ideology

Two Sides of the Same Tyranny Coin

Today I saw this tweet:

 I askеd KD about his view on all of this, he said ‘It’s an individual dеcision.’ That’s the antithеsis of what a pandеmic is. You do not havе the privilеge of just looking at yoursеlf. You havе to look at the pеople nеxt to you. That’s how we got to this bеing the most dеadly pandеmic.

Sound familiar? Climatists want to cancel individual satisfactions in order to save the human race. Covid Nazis make the same demand: Give up your individual opinions and choices for humanity.

There are many posts here and elsewhere debunking the climate crisis hoax, but it may be new to realize that covid is neither a pandemic nor as deadly as claimed.  Dr. Ted Noel explains in his American Thinker article Why Is the COVID Case Count So High? Excerpts in italics with my bolds.

The CDC used to define a “case” as a patient whose characteristic signs, symptoms, and physical examination matched a disease. Labs were only done if clinically needed. Since the “pandemic,” however, the move to boost case numbers is everywhere.

Instantly, a “positive” RT-PCR test in an asymptomatic person after a drive-through tonsillectomy became a “case.” The CARES Act gives thousands extra to hospitals for every “positive,” with a big bonus if the patient’s shadow is seen in an ICU. It’s a classic “one hand washes the other scenario” between outside labs and hospitals. “If you give me more positive results, I get more money, so I’ll send more tests to you.”

My hospital’s Medical Staff President flatly denied any CARES Act benefits at our 2020 Medical Staff Extravaganza, but the incentives can’t be denied. My hospital still sends “coders” out to demand that staff order COVID tests to get more payments. Put bluntly, there’s no way to know what any test means medically if the patient isn’t sick. But “positives” definitely mean money!

MIQE standards list eighty-five parameters that must be met in RT-PCR testing. Does every lab meet them all every time? Around the world, celebrities who test “positive” one day and “negative” the next strongly suggest that a lot of mistakes are being made. This is unsurprising since as early as 2017, the technique was well known for “lack of reproducibility.”

The inventor of the test stated that RT-PCR was never intended to be a diagnostic test and using it as one was scientifically illegitimate. “[It’s] like trying to say whether somebody has bad breath by looking at his fingerprint.”

Proper testing requires checking three genetic elements, widely separated in the genome. For CDC counts and CARES Act payments, only two segments get tested, automatically increasing the number of positive tests – by a lot. The lab starts the RT-PCR by doubling genetic material multiple times to make it easier to identify. In research, if it’s not positive by thirty-five “amplification cycles,”, it’s not positive. FDA guidance indicates that anything found up to 40 cycles is considered “positive.” At forty cycles a glass of water may test positive. Stopping at thirty-five would show that COVID-19 wasn’t any worse than flu, if it was that bad.

There is no pandemic. There never was.

Since only 6% of “COVID deaths” were from only the bug, there have only been about 40,000 total, roughly equal to seasonal flu. In the early days, we didn’t know how to treat it and rationally feared that the new Black Death had arrived. But by May of last year, we already knew that HCQ was probably effective in early cases. Early treatment would cause a (non)crisis to go to waste, and that could not be allowed. So very effective treatments and excellent prophylactic measures were suppressed.

Ineffective masks, social distancing, vaccine passports, lockdowns, and the like were mandated. They became part of an “Orange Man Bad” publicity campaign. Anthony Fauci gave President Trump awful advice following that game plan. Trump’s flair for publicity boomeranged in news conferences where he trumpeted his successes, but all anyone really heard was panic porn.

Certainly, the prospect of centralizing power is intoxicating to the elect. But is that it? Are hospitals the only recipients of largess?

For about twenty years, Fauci’s NIAID used taxpayer money to do “invisible” research on deadly viruses. It received unlawful patents related to a certain virus that might become worth a king’s ransom. Such filthy lucre could become very attractive.

Before you start throwing rotten tomatoes and soiled work boots, please watch David Martin Ph.D. and Reiner Fuellmich tell why they believe Anthony Fauci and his cohorts were neck-deep in the COVID gain-of-function and patent process for at least the last twenty-two years. Among the key patents are some that, if they are for a naturally occurring virus, are illegal according to the Supreme Court. If they’re for an engineered virus, they’re contrary to the Biological Weapons Convention, which became effective in 1975. Martin and Fuellmich allege that the parties to this corrupt process include Anthony Fauci, Ralph Baric, Peter Daszak, Dr. Shi Zhengli (the Wuhan Bat Lady), and—drum roll, please—none other than Bill Gates. Dr. Martin has made available a long list of documents he contends support this claim.

These alleged conspirators have spent a considerable amount of time and effort to set themselves up to profit from a vaccine industry that would likely be given huge subsidies and immunities to respond to a “coronavirus pandemic.” Yes, that’s what they literally war-gamed along the way. Martin and Fuellmich present strong evidence of collusion between the virus creators and vaccine manufacturers. Is it any surprise that an mRNA COVID-19 “vaccine” was ready for early testing within four months of the announcement of the virus?

We cannot leave this subject without asking if the vaccines actually stop infection.

No vaccine can prevent infection. That’s because you must be infected before your T-cells and antibodies (humoral immunity) can crank up.

In COVID-19, the problem is more complicated. Even if you’re vaccinated, COVID aerosols still enter your lungs, where the virus attaches to pneumocytes in your air sacs (alveoli). It multiplies inside those cells, and they shed a lot of virus back into the alveoli, where you can now share it with the next person as effectively as someone who’s sick. Voila! Asymptomatic transmission!

You’ll also be a “case” at your next drive-through impalement. But you aren’t sick and don’t get sick. You don’t have a clinical “case” of COVID, but you’ll be one for the next Panic Porn Live at 6:30! Your vaccination status won’t matter. “At the country-level, there appears to be no discernable relationship between percentage of population fully vaccinated and new COVID-19 cases in the last 7 days.”

If you are immune, some of that virus will still find its way across the alveolar basement membrane into your bloodstream. That’s where your humoral immunity will mop it up and keep you from getting sick. But you are a “case!” And your house cat may be as well. Big cats in the National Zoo have been treated for the Wuhan Flu. Fido can get it, too.

There is nothing we can do to slow down COVID-19. It rapidly spread through society because it was “in the wild.” Vaccinated and unvaccinated can spread the virus equally. Even if every person gets vaccinated, we still won’t have perfect protection because the virus mutates, leaving older vaccine-induced immunity less effective. That’s why two of the most vaccinated regions in the world, Israel and Gibraltar, are having huge spikes in the bug.

The CDC definition of a “COVID case” is a political construct designed to funnel taxpayer money to favored individuals and institutions.

It has nothing to do with the course of the disease. Only 6% of “COVID deaths” were exclusively from COVID. The other 94% would likely have died of their other diseases without the virus. Many of those who died would still be alive if the Feds weren’t suppressing HCQ and Ivermectin early treatment protocols…which our “betters” in Congress are themselves reported to be using.

 

 

Bogus Talk about Climate Tipping Points

Tallbloke’s Talkshop helpfully posted on a new study Climate change tipping points may be too simple a concept, say researchers.  This is welcome to hear, but as I will discuss below, the authors do not go nearly far enough to let the air out of this exaggerated rhetoric.  The study itself is Evasion of tipping in complex systems through spatial pattern formation.  The title already suggests a questionable paradigm, which is stated up front in the abstract:

In the Anthropocene, there is a need to better understand the catastrophic effects that climate and land-use change may have on ecosystems, Earth system components, and the whole Earth system. The concept of critical transitions, or tipping from one state to another, contributes to this understanding.

The above diagram from the study shows the tipping point paradigm accepted by the authors as a foundation for discovering how ecosystems are sometimes able to evade tipping over from a present state.  It is heartening that the authors refer to the resilience of ecosystems and say that observed ecological disturbances are in fact evidence of natural stability, not fragility.

However, they are applying a theory of “tipping points” that pertains to sociology not natural science, while also assuming, of course, the environmental mythological Garden of Eden that would be eternal and unchanging except for human evil activity.

The whole paradigm is a corruption of hard physical science by soft sociological fuzzy thinking, a specialty of environmentalism.

Firstly, the popularity of the “tipping points” notion comes from pop sociology, and there are many good reasons not to bring it into earth sciences, unless the intent is to politicize the science. A reprinted post below provides this discussion.

Background from previous post Tipping Points Confuse Social and Earth Science

In the drive to push public opinion over the top regarding global warming/climate change, the media is increasingly filled with references to climate “tipping points.”  For example, some months ago an IPCC spokesperson claimed a climate disaster is now happening each and every week.  And the media abounds with reports to press home the point. Here are some of the current disasters caused by climate change, ripped (as they say) from the headlines.

Birds are shrinking as the climate warms

Climate change-related deaths and damage on the rise

Europe Could Face Annual Extreme Heat Waves Due to Climate Change

Food Prices Expected To Jump Next Year Due To Climate Change

Climate change taking serious toll on human health: WHO report

Climate Crisis Causing Hunger for Millions of Africans

How climate change is causing more premature births

Et cetera, et cetera. (A complete list would provide more than one disaster for every week of the year.)

IOW, as Pys.org reported, all this hype may make this year the tipping point: The year the world woke up to the climate emergency.

Background on the Use of “Tipping Points”

The context for understanding the rise of the “tipping point” notion is provided by a 2018 paper in Environmental Research Letters Defining tipping points for social-ecological systems scholarship—an interdisciplinary literature review. As the title suggests the researchers are not studying the earth, but rather people’s perceptions about the earth. This growing field of environmental psychology confirms how “climate change” muddles social and physical sciences. Excerpts in italics with my bolds

Abstract

The term tipping point has experienced explosive popularity across multiple disciplines over the last decade. Research on social-ecological systems (SES) has contributed to the growth and diversity of the term’s use. The diverse uses of the term obscure potential differences between tipping behavior in natural and social systems, and issues of causality across natural and social system components in SES. This paper aims to create the foundation for a discussion within the SES research community about the appropriate use of the term tipping point, especially the relatively novel term ‘social tipping point.’

We review existing literature on tipping points and similar concepts (e.g. regime shifts, critical transitions) across all spheres of science published between 1960 and 2016 with a special focus on a recent and still small body of work on social tipping points. We combine quantitative and qualitative analyses in a bibliometric approach, rooted in an expert elicitation process.

Historical Analysis and Concerns

We find that the term tipping point became popular after the year 2000—long after the terms regime shift and critical transition—across all spheres of science. We identify 23 distinct features of tipping point definitions and their prevalence across disciplines, but find no clear taxonomy of discipline-specific definitions. Building on the most frequently used features, we propose definitions for tipping points in general and social tipping points in SES in particular.

Being located at the intersection between the social and natural sciences, SES researchers need to tread carefully when borrowing concepts from other disciplines. Such a move often involves the crossing of ontological boundaries, where the metaphorical use of a concept can mask important differences between two objects of study. The two phenomena included in the analogy should be similar in the sense that they can be characterized by common laws or principles. The success of the analogy depends on whether attributes of tipping points in the target domain can be tested and assessed similar to the one in the source domain (Daniel 1955, Gentner 1983). However, SES research pays little attention to whether the presumed observation of tipping behavior in a social system is conceptually equal or (partly) different than tipping processes in an ecological system. It remains unknown whether tipping points in natural systems, such as a lake or the climate, display the same underlying mechanisms as tipping points in social systems, such as in financial markets or political institutions.

The tipping point concept traces its origins back to scientific papers in chemistry (Hoadley 1884) and mathematics (Poincare´ 1885), which refer to a qualitative change in a system described mathematically as a bifurcation. Bifurcation theory is still used today in mathematics, physics, complex systems science, and related fields.

In the social sciences, tipping points originated much later to address neighborhood dynamics of racial segregation in political science (Grodzins 1957), sociology/urban planning (Wolf 1963), and economics (Schelling 1978). Social scientists began to develop similar concepts of social change without the tipping point language. For example, sociologist Mark Granovetter (1978) uses the term threshold to understand the differences in individuals’ decisions to engage in a collective behavior, such as rioting.

Whether or not it can be attributed to Malcolm Gladwell’s book The Tipping Point (2000), starting around 2005, the term was widely adopted among climate scientists (Russill and Nyssa 2009, Kopp et al 2016) to describe rapid, non-linear change in parts of the climate system. Previously this phenomenon had been referred to with different terminology, such as critical points, but now climate scientists embraced tipping point language, with three papers using tipping point terminology to focus on ice sheet dynamics in the Arctic (Holland et al 2006, Lindsay and Zhang 2005, Winton 2006). A 2008 paper introduced the idea of tipping elements in the climate system, defined as subsystems of the climate system that can experience abrupt change,‘triggering a transition to a new state.’

The historical account of the movement of the concept from its origins in mathematics and chemistry to the social sciences, popular discourse and back to mathematical modeling in the climate sciences raises important scientific questions.

The increasingly frequent use of the concept of tipping points in both the natural and social sciences could be scientifically questionable: sociological and political tipping points might be very different phenomena than climatic tipping points, even if both natural and social systems may be subject to rapid qualitative change. If institutional tipping and ecosystem tipping are different ‘things in nature’— different ontological entities—scientific language should not treat them as the same. Scientific language should clarify rather than veil potential differences between tipping points in different fields.

Phenomena in nature—the objects of tipping point research Different fields of science deploy tipping point terminology to study vastly different real-world phenomena. In the natural sciences (Ecology, Climate and Earth System Science), scholars are primarily interested in the tipping of ecological systems, e.g. the eutrophication of lakes, and of larger Earth System components, also called climate tipping elements (e.g. Arctic ice sheets). This research crosses multiple scales of interest, but focuses on a shared mechanism of change: positive, self-reinforcing feedbacks moving a system into a different stability domain. Key research challenges include the limited reversibility of a system to its previous state and significant predictive challenges related to tipping points.

Conclusions

To conclude, we have proposed a unifying definition for tipping points, building on the most frequent themes identified in our analysis: a tipping point is a threshold at which small quantitative changes in the system trigger a non-linear change process that is driven by system-internal feedback mechanisms and inevitably leads to a qualitatively different state of the system, which is often irreversible.  This definition establishes a minimum set of four constitutive features of tipping points that apply across disciplines:

    • multiple stable states;
    • non-linear change;
    • feedbacks as driving mechanism; 
    • limited reversibility. 

If these four essential characteristics are given, the use of the term tipping point is justified.  However, whether it is possible to apply these tools to social and social-ecological change phenomena remains unclear and is a subject that requires future research.

Our research found that the tipping point concept is applied to a vast array of change processes, ranging from ice sheet dynamics to societal transformations, which might mask ontological differences between these diverse phenomena. Concerned about the pattern of terminological replacement—the use of tipping point language instead of previously existing terms—and its potential effects on the quality of science, we encourage researchers to critically assess their terminological choices and avoid ‘conceptual amnesia’.

My Comment

Besides the issue of confusing natural and social processes, the paper only touched tangentially on three related problems applying this terminology to global warming/climate change.  Firstly, in the natural world there are shifts between multiple stable states, in some cases reversing back and forth in cyclical patterns.  For example, paleoclimatologists have mapped the earth’s oscillations between “hot house” and “ice house.”

Secondly, headlines like those above always portray change as negative and destructive.  In both natural and social tipping points there can be desirable, transformative shifts, not just adverse, gloomy results.
Thirdly, as Brothers Judd warn, there is less than meets the eye in claims of tipping points.  From their review of Gladwell’s book:

As a general matter Gladwell’s Tipping Point idea, like Darwin’s idea of Evolution, is grounded more in literary metaphor than in science. If you ask, as Gladwell does, why Hush Puppies suddenly became fashionable again after years of declining or stagnant sales, the answer must be that they hit a Tipping Point. If you ask why they stayed unpopular for so long, the answer must be there were no Tipping Points during that time. Why did the book Divine Secrets of the Ya-Ya Sisterhood become a best seller, while Rebecca Wells’s previous books hadn’t, or other (better) novels didn’t ? One hit a Tipping Point, the others didn’t. But this doesn’t really add anything to our understanding of the human behavior and desires that fueled the crazes nor does it help us to determine how to tip other products and processes in the future. Gladwell’s argument, like all pseudoscience, is a closed loop–if something tips then it hit a Tipping Point; if it doesn’t, then it didn’t. Rather than explaining what happened, the metaphor, once accepted, stifles intelligent analysis. The fact that something happened comes to seem a sufficient explanation and a justification for saying that the process occurred; the actual elements of this theoretical process need never be demonstrated, nor tested; it’s as if the circular beauty of the metaphor precludes questioning its validity.

Daniel B. Botkin is Professor Emeritus, University of California, Santa Barbara, in the Department of Ecology, Evolution, and Marine Biology.

Secondly, the notion of a static climate system, absent human impacts, is backward thinking, superseded by Dynamic Ecology, a more contemporary and realistic understanding.

For a more realistic view of nature and biological processes see writings by Daniel Botkin, who led the shift in paradigm to Dynamic Ecology, especially in his influential book: Discordant Harmonies: a New Ecology for the Twenty-first Century. 1990 Oxford University Press, New York. In 2014 he shared his view of the climate change issue in Testimony to the House Subcommittee on Science,Space and Technology. The whole document is enlightening, and included point-by-point critique of IPCC statements. Transcript is: Testimony to the House Subcommittee on Science,Space and Technology.

His main points are highlighted below, while details and examples are in the full text.

1.I want to state up front that we have been living through a warming trend driven by a variety of influences. However, it is my view that this is not unusual, and contrary to the characterizations by the IPCC and the National Climate Assessment, these environmental changes are not apocalyptic nor irreversible.

2.My biggest concern is that both the reports present a number of speculative, and sometimes incomplete, conclusions embedded in language that gives them more scientific heft than they deserve. The reports are “scientific-sounding” rather than based on clearly settled facts or admitting their lack. Established facts about the global environment exist less often in science than laymen usually think.

3.HAS IT BEEN WARMING? Yes, we have been living through a warming trend, no doubt about that. The rate of change we are experiencing is also not unprecedented, and the “mystery” of the warming “plateau” simply indicates the inherent complexity of our global biosphere. Change is normal, life on Earth is inherently risky; it always has been. The two reports, however, makes it seem that environmental change is apocalyptic and irreversible. It is not.

4.IS CLIMATE CHANGE VERY UNUSUAL? No, it has always undergone changes.

5.ARE GREENHOUSE GASES INCREASING? Yes, CO2 rapidly.

6.IS THERE GOOD SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON CLIMATE CHANGE? Yes, a great deal of it.

7.ARE THERE GOOD SCIENTISTS INVOLVED IN THE IPCC 2014 REPORT? Yes, the lead author of the Terrestrial (land) Ecosystem Report is Richard Betts, a coauthor of one my scientific papers about forecasting effects of global warming on biodiversity.

8. ARE THERE SCIENTIFICALLY ACCURATE STATEMENTS AT PLACES IN THE REPORT? Yes, there are.

9. What I sought to learn was the overall take-away that the reports leave with a reader. I regret to say that I was left with the impression that the reports overestimate the danger from human-induced climate change and do not contribute to our ability to solve major environmental problems. I am afraid that an “agenda” permeates the reports, an implication that humans and our activity are necessarily bad and ought to be curtailed.

10. ARE THERE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THE REPORTS? Yes, in assumptions, use of data, and conclusions.

11. My biggest concern about the reports is that they present a number of speculative, and sometimes incomplete, conclusions embedded in language that gives them more scientific heft than they deserve. The reports, in other words, are “scientific-sounding,” rather than clearly settled and based on indisputable facts. Established facts about the global environment exist less often in science than laymen usually think.

12. The two reports assume and/or argue that the climate warming forecast by the global climate models is happening and will continue to happen and grow worse. Currently these predictions are way off the reality (Figure 1). Models, like all scientific theory, have to be tested against real-world observations. Experts in model validation say that the climate models frequently cited in the IPCC report are little if any validated. This means that as theory they are fundamentally scientifically unproven.

13. The reports suffer from using the term “climate change” with two meanings: natural and human-induced. These are both given as definitions in the IPCC report and are not distinguished in the text and therefore confuse a reader. (The Climate Change Assessment uses the term throughout including its title, but never defines it.) There are places in the reports where only the second meaning—human induced—makes sense, so that meaning has to be assumed. There are other places where either meaning could be applied.

14. Some of the report conclusions are the opposite of those given in articles cited in defense of those conclusions.

15. Some conclusions contradict and are ignorant of the best statistically valid observations.

16. The report for policy makers on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability repeats the assertion of previous IPCC reports that “large fraction of species” face “increase extinction risks” (p15). Overwhelming evidence contradicts this assertion. And it has been clearly shown that models used to make these forecasts, such as climate envelope models and species-area curve models, make incorrect assumptions that lead to erroneous conclusions, over-estimating extinction risks. Surprisingly few species became extinct during the past 2.5 million years, a period encompassing several ice ages and warm periods.

17. THE REPORT GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT LIVING THINGS ARE FRAGILE AND RIGID, unable to deal with change. The opposite is to case. Life is persistent, adaptable, adjustable.

18. STEADY-STATE ASSUMPTION: There is an overall assumption in the IPCC 2014 report and the Climate Change Assessment that all change is negative and undesirable; that it is ecologically and evolutionarily unnatural, bad for populations, species, ecosystems, for all life on planet Earth, including people. This is the opposite of the reality.

19. The summary for policy makers on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability makes repeated use of the term “irreversible” changes. A species going extinct is irreversible, but little else about the environment is irreversible.

20. The extreme overemphasis on human-induced global warming has taken our attention away from many environmental issues that used to be front and center but have been pretty much ignored in the 21st century.

21. Do the problems with these reports mean that we can or should abandon any concerns about global warming or abandon any research about it? Certainly not, but we need to put this issue within an appropriate priority with other major here-and-now environmental issues that are having immediate effects.

22. The concerns I have mentioned with the IPCC apply as well to the White House’s National Climate Assessment.

Summary

Finally, as the critique shows, tipping points are like climate change itself:  Applying labels to something that has already happened, with no predictive utility.

 

 

Scary Warming Everywhere Elsewhere

Recent posts here discussed how rapidly has cooling set in this year.  Of course that reality is inconvenient in the run up to Glasgow COP, so the scramble is on to claim that 2021 is hotter than ever.  A previous post Heat Records Silly Season Again provides background for understanding that there are literally millions of temperature records that can be packaged to support any desirable warming or cooling claim.

A current example of such packaging is found in a recent tweet thread from Zeke Hausfather, a climate analyst who helped build the BEST dataset and a supporter of the IPCC agenda.

A curious person would note that only summer and land is shown, and would wonder: What am I not seeing?  And then in the thread are various comments saying it was not at all warm where I live, this doesn’t add up.  And then someone shows another graph from BEST giving a different impression.

Climate reporting is confusing because the scope of temperature averaging gives very different impressions, and at the mega scale rarely corresponds to anyone’s particular experience.  So generalizations are claimed extrapolating from statistics, contradicted by many persons’ direct experience.

NOAA State of the Climate is another site advocating for the IPCC agenda and illustrates how this works.  First the Global Climate Report:

So there is the #1 warmest land summer, but we now can see the Ocean was 6th and combined Global is 4th, not 1st.  Now let’s look at the year to date (YTD):

Oh oh, that’s not as scary; the first two-thirds of 2021 are not #1, but #6, and with autumn coming on could go even lower. And to understand why most people will be put off by Hausfather’s claim, we go to the Regional Analysis in order to see what the year has been like in various continents (land by definition).

It becomes obvious that no matter where I live, don’t tell me this is the hottest year ever. OK some Africans may agree, but those in Oceania (mostly Australians) will boo you out of the room.  And as for tourist destinations,  forget about it:Footnote: Everyone has an agenda and packages data in support of their POV.  Those who joined the anti-fossil fuel crusade are bound to find and amplify any bit of global warming they can find.  My agenda is for people to consider the full amount of relevant data and facts, and to reason accordingly rather than go along with the crowd or their feelings.  My approach is best expressed in this essay:

I Want You Not to Panic

 

Arctic Ice In Perspective 2021

With Arctic ice melting season winding down, warmists will again stoke fears about ice disappearing in the North. In fact, the pattern of Arctic ice seen in historical perspective is not alarming. People are over-thinking and over-analyzing Arctic Ice extents, and getting wrapped around the axle (or should I say axis).  So let’s keep it simple and we can all readily understand what is happening up North.

I have noticed at some other blogs people complain about my monthly Arctic ice updates focusing on extents starting in 2007. This post will show why that time period is entirely reasonable as a subject for analysis. I will use the ever popular NOAA dataset derived from satellite passive microwave sensors.  It sometimes understates the ice extents, but everyone refers to it and it is complete from 1979 to present.  Here’s what NOAA reports (in M km2):

We are frequently told that only the March maximums and the September minimums matter, since the other months are only transitional between the two.  So the graph above shows the mean ice extent, averaging the two months March and September. We have 8 more days to go in September 2021, so that number is a low-ball estimate (4.9M km2) that will likely go higher.

If I were adding this to the Ice House of Mirrors, the name would be The X-Ray Ice Mirror, because it looks into the structure of the time series.   For even more clarity and simplicity, here is the table:

NOAA NH Annual Average Ice Extents (in M km2).  Sea Ice Index v3.0 (here)

Year Average Change Rate of Change
1979 11.697
1996 11.353 -0.344 -0.020 per year
2007 9.405 -1.949 -0.177 per year
2021 9.773  +0.368 +0.026 per year

The satellites involve rocket science, but this does not.  There was a small loss of ice extent over the first 17 years, then a dramatic downturn for 11 years, 9 times the rate as before. That was followed by the current 14-year plateau with a slight gain comparable to the beginning loss.  All the fuss is over that middle period, and we know what caused it.  A lot of multi-year ice was flushed out through the Fram Strait, leaving behind more easily melted younger ice. The effects from that natural occurrence bottomed out in 2007.

Kwok et al say this about the Variability of Fram Strait ice flux:

The average winter area flux over the 18-year record (1978–1996) is 670,000 km2, ;7% of the area of the Arctic Ocean. The winter area flux ranges from a minimum of 450,000 km2 in 1984 to a maximum of 906,000 km2 in 1995. . .The average winter volume flux over the winters of October 1990 through May 1995 is 1745 km3 ranging from a low of 1375 km3 in the 1990 flux to a high of 2791 km3 in 1994.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261010602/download

Conclusion:

Some complain it is too soon to say Arctic Ice is recovering, or that 2007 is a true change point.  The same people were quick to jump on a declining period after 1996 as evidence of a “Death Spiral.”

Footnote:

No one knows what will happen to Arctic ice.

Except maybe the polar bears.

And they are not talking.

Except, of course, to the admen from Coca-Cola

All About Hurricanes

And there is the University of Miami Hurricanes sports team logo:

But many are interested in what to make of the latest one, Hurricane Ida.  She did after all flood the US Open tennis venue one night, although matches resumed the next day.

And in Louisiana, the flooding was major, although the new dikes in New Orleans held.

Of course the media, always certain of their story and impervious to contrary facts and details, declared Ida proof positive of a climate “emergency.”

Some anonymous scribbler put the PC words in Biden’s mouth:

Scientists have warned about extreme weather “for decades” and the U.S. doesn’t have “any more time” to confront it, he said.  “Every part of the country is getting hit by extreme weather, and we’re now living in real time what the country’s going to look like,” Biden told reporters.  Hurricane Ida Is An ‘Opportunity’ to Act on ‘Global Warming’ – ‘We either act or we’re going to be in real, real trouble’.

So what to make of these storms and the threat of global warming climate change?

Firstly,these storms are dangerous.  As the joke goes:

Q: Why are storms named after women?
A: Because they come in hot and steamy, then they leave with your house and car.

Of course, this is now considered sexist, in spite of the traditional respect for women as forces of nature.  In fact, nowadays in the age of genderism, some parents name their newborns “Storm” in order to leave their kids’ options open.  But I digress.

This post is really about understanding tropical storms in their historical context.  And for that we have an excellent recent scientific study published in Nature Changes in Atlantic major hurricane frequency since the late-19th century. by Vecchi, Landsea et al. Excerpts in italics with my bolds.

Introduction

Tropical cyclones (TCs) are of intense scientific interest and are a major threat to human life and property across the globe. Of particular interest are multi-decadal changes in TC frequency arising from some combination of intrinsic variability in the weather and climate system, and the response to natural and anthropogenic climate forcing.  Even though the North Atlantic (NA) basin is a minor contributor to global TC frequency, Atlantic hurricanes (HUs) have been the topic of considerable research both because of the long-term records of their track and frequency that exist for this basin, and because of their impacts at landfall. It is convenient and common to consider Saffir-Simpson Categories 3–5 (peak sustained winds exceeding 50 ms−1) HUs separately from the overall frequency, and label them major hurricanes, or MHs. Historically, MHs have accounted for ~80% of hurricane-related damage in the United States of America (USA) despite only representing 34% of USA TC occurrences.

Globally, models and theoretical arguments indicate that in a warming world the HU peak intensity and intensification rate should increase, so that there is a tendency for the fraction of HU reaching high Saffir-Simpson Categories (3, 4, or 5) to increase in models in response to CO2 increases, yet model projections are more mixed regarding changes in the frequency of MHs in individual basins.

Has there been a century-scale change in the number of the most intense hurricanes in the North Atlantic?

Due to changes in observing practices, severe inhomogeneities exist in this database, complicating the assessment of long-term changes.  In particular, there has been a substantial increase in monitoring capacity over the past 170 years, so that the probability that a HU is observed is substantially higher in the present than early in the record; the recorded increase in both Atlantic TC and HU frequency in HURDAT2 since the late-19th century is consistent with the impact of known changes in observing practices. Major hurricane frequency estimates can also be impacted by changing observing systems

Hurricane and major hurricane frequency adjusted for missing storms

Previous work has led to the development of a number of methods to estimate the impact of changing observing capabilities on the recorded increase in basin-wide HU frequency between 1878 and 2008 (ref. 10). We here update the analysis of ref. 10 to build an adjustment to recorded HU counts over 1851–1971, based on the characteristics of observed HUs over 1972–2019. We then extend that methodology to build an adjustment to recorded MH counts over 1851–1971, based on MHs recorded over 1972–2019 (see “Methods”).

Once the adjustment is added to the recorded number of Atlantic HUs and MHs, substantial year-to-year and decade-to-decade variability is still present in the data, with the late-19th, mid-20th and early-21st centuries showing relative maxima, and the early 20th and late 20th centuries showing local minima (Fig. 2). However, after adjustment, the recent epoch (1995–2019) does not stand out as unprecedented in either basin-wide HU or MH frequency. There have been notable years since 2000 in terms of basin-wide HU frequency, but we cannot exclude at the 95% level that the most active years in terms of NA basin-wide HU or MH frequency occurred in either the 19th century or mid-20th century (blue lines and shading in Fig. 2a, b). Further, we cannot exclude that the most active epoch for NA HU frequency was in the late-19th century, with the mid-20th century comparable to the early-21st in terms of basin-wide HU frequency. The 19th century maximum in activity is more pronounced in overall frequency than in MH frequency, while the late-20th century multi-decadal temporary dip in MH frequency stands out relative to that in the early-20th century.

Ratio of the 15-year running count of United States of America (USA) strikes and 15-year running count of basin-wide frequency for hurricanes (a) and major hurricanes (b). Dotted gray line shows the values based on the recorded version 2 of the North Atlantic Hurricane Database (HURDAT2, ref. 33) frequency, while the thick solid line shows the value based on the HURDAT2 recorded USA strikes and the adjusted basin-wide frequencies; blue shading shows the 95% range on the ratio based on a Bootstrap sampling of the adjustment values. Gray background shading is as in Fig. 1, and highlights times where we have reduced confidence in the basin-wide and USA strike frequency estimates even after adjusting for likely missing storms.

Conclusion

Caution should be taken in connecting recent changes in Atlantic hurricane activity to the century-scale warming of our planet.

The adjusted records presented here provide a century-scale context with which to interpret recent studies indicating a significant recent increase in NA MH/HU ratio over 1980–2017 (ref. 14), or in the fraction of NA tropical storms that rapidly intensified over 1982–2009 (ref. 15). Our results indicate that the recent increase in NA basin-wide MH/HU ratio or MH frequency is not part of a century-scale increase. Rather it is a rebound from a deep local minimum in the 1960s–1980s.

We hypothesize that these recent increases contain a substantial, even dominant, contribution from internal climate variability, and/or late-20th century aerosol increases and subsequent decreases, in addition to any contributions from recent greenhouse gas-induced warming. It has been hypothesized, for example, that aerosol-induced reductions in surface insolation over the tropical Atlantic since between the mid-20th century and the 1980s may have resulted in an inhibition of tropical cyclone activity; the relative contributions of anthropogenic sulfate aerosols, dust, and volcanic aerosols to this signal (each of which would carry distinct implications for future hurricane evolution)—along with the magnitude and impact of aerosol-mediated cloud changes—remain a vigorous topic of scientific inquiry. It has also been suggested that multi-decadal climate variations connected to changes in meridional ocean overturning may have resulted in a minimum in northward heat transport in the Atlantic and a resulting reduction in Atlantic hurricane activity.

Given the uncertainties that presently exist in understanding multi-decadal climate variability, the climate response to aerosols and impact of greenhouse gas warming on NA TC activity, care must be exercised in not over-interpreting the implications of, and causes behind, these recent NA MH increases. Disentangling the relative impact of multiple climate drivers on NA MH activity is crucial to building a more confident assessment of the likely course of future HU activity in a world where the effects of greenhouse gas changes are expected to become increasingly important.

Footnote:

Pacific hurricanes (typhoons) also show no increase with global warming

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Resilient Arctic Ice September 2021

The animation shows Arctic ice extents on day 248 in 2007 (matching 14 year average), then the same day in 2019, 2020, and yesterday in 2021.  Note that Hudson Bay upper left is open water, and below that Baffin Bay next to Greenland is also ice-free.  In the center Canadian Archipelago holds a lot of ice, especially this year.  Also unusual in 2021 is ice covering Svalbard lower right all the way to Europe mainland.  Also upper right 2021 shows ice in Chukchi touching Russian coastline.

The graph above shows mid-August to mid-Sept daily ice extents for 2021 compared to 14 year averages, and some years of note.  During the 17 days from August 18 to yesterday, the black  line shows Arctic Ice extent declined on average by 1M km2 (1 Wadham).  Meanwhile the cyan line shows MASIE 2021 ice extents lost only 171k km2, and Sea Ice Index (SII) in orange lost 317k km2. Note on day 230 all three lines started at the same value.

Why is this important?  All the claims of global climate emergency depend on dangerously higher temperatures, lower sea ice, and rising sea levels.  The lack of additional warming is documented in a post Adios, Global Warming

The lack of acceleration in sea levels along coastlines has been discussed also.  See USCS Warnings of Coastal Flooding

Also, a longer term perspective is informative:

post-glacial_sea_levelThe table below shows the distribution of Sea Ice across the Arctic Regions, on average, this year and 2007.

Region 2021248 Day 248 Average 2021-Ave. 2007248 2021-2020
 (0) Northern_Hemisphere 5464375 4672631 791744 4751076 713299
 (1) Beaufort_Sea 798213 522472 275741 665051 133162
 (2) Chukchi_Sea 524060 202259 321800 116358 407702
 (3) East_Siberian_Sea 408523 310662 97862 6329 402195
 (4) Laptev_Sea 51574 143286 -91712 280600 -229026
 (5) Kara_Sea 122087 30192 91896 103072 19015
 (6) Barents_Sea 18 15631 -15612 10766 -10748
 (7) Greenland_Sea 98270 176374 -78104 334524 -236254
 (8) Baffin_Bay_Gulf_of_St._Lawrence 16983 23131 -6148 31787 -14804
 (9) Canadian_Archipelago 440366 288302 152064 270755 169612
 (10) Hudson_Bay 39285 15338 23947 29961 9324
 (11) Central_Arctic 2963852 2944150 19702 2900617 63235

The overall surplus to average is 792k km2, (+17%).  Note large surpluses of ice in BCE (Beaufort, Chukchi and East Siberian seas).  Meanwhile Laptev on the Russian coast melted out early, as has Greenland Sea.  Kara and CAA (Canadian Arctic Archipelago) are holding considerable ice.  We are about 12 days away from the annual minimum mid September, but at this point it appears that extents will be much greater than the last two years.

See also Abundant August Arctic Ice with 2021 Minimum Outlook

bathymetric_map_arctic_ocean

 

Illustration by Eleanor Lutz shows Earth’s seasonal climate changes. If played in full screen, the four corners present views from top, bottom and sides. It is a visual representation of scientific datasets measuring Arctic ice extents.

Arctic Ice Hockey Stick August 2021

Arctic2021235 w HS

The graph above shows August daily ice extents for 2021 compared to 14 year averages, and some years of note.

The black line shows during this period on average Arctic ice extents decline ~2M km2 from ~6.8M km2 down to ~4.8M km2.  The Hockey Stick shape refers to the 2021 cyan MASIE line starting ~227k km2 below average but matching average by day 230, and in the last five days produced a surplus of 414k km2.  The Sea Ice Index in orange (SII from NOAA) started with the same deficit and also matched MASIE average day 230, but tracking the downward average since.  2019 and 2020 were well below average at this stage of the summer melt.

Why is this important?  All the claims of global climate emergency depend on dangerously higher temperatures, lower sea ice, and rising sea levels.  The lack of additional warming is documented in a post Adios, Global Warming

The lack of acceleration in sea levels along coastlines has been discussed also.  See USCS Warnings of Coastal Flooding

Also, a longer term perspective is informative:

post-glacial_sea_levelThe table below shows the distribution of Sea Ice across the Arctic Regions, on average, this year and 2007.

Region 2021235 Day 235 Average 2021-Ave. 2007235 2021-2007
 (0) Northern_Hemisphere 5745634 5331499 414135 5309870 435765
 (1) Beaufort_Sea 872981 605537 267444 730813 142168
 (2) Chukchi_Sea 539676 329819 209856 178493 361182
 (3) East_Siberian_Sea 508990 445221 63769 63523 445468
 (4) Laptev_Sea 61548 205077 -143529 295384 -233836
 (5) Kara_Sea 136181 58898 77283 155754 -19573
 (6) Barents_Sea 6047 24071 -18025 17998 -11951
 (7) Greenland_Sea 84815 202922 -118108 334622 -249808
 (8) Baffin_Bay_Gulf_of_St._Lawrence 40877 33602 7275 50303 -9426
 (9) Canadian_Archipelago 465781 354257 111524 323329 142452
 (10) Hudson_Bay 64148 35761 28387 61078 3070
 (11) Central_Arctic 2964500 3035379 -70879 3097316 -132816

The overall surplus to average is 414k km2, (8%).  Note large surpluses of ice in BCE (Beaufort, Chukchi and East Siberian seas).  Meanwhile Laptev on the Russian coast melted out early, as has Greenland Sea.  Kara and CAA (Canadian Arctic Archipelago) are holding considerable ice.  We are about a month away from the annual minimum mid September, but at this point it appears that extents will be greater than the last two years.

bathymetric_map_arctic_ocean

 

Illustration by Eleanor Lutz shows Earth’s seasonal climate changes. If played in full screen, the four corners present views from top, bottom and sides. It is a visual representation of scientific datasets measuring Arctic ice extents.