Alarmist Heads in the Clouds

A new study from Scripps at UC San Diego claims proof of greenhouse gas warming by means of changes to the clouds. The paper is behind a paywall, so the reasoning is not accessible, but the media releases will ensure wide repetition.

From the news release July 11, 2016 (here)
Clouds Are Moving Higher, Subtropical Dry Zones Expanding, According to Satellite Analysis
Scripps-led study confirms computerized climate simulations projecting effects of global warming

Inconsistent satellite imaging of clouds over the decades has been a hindrance to improving scientists’ understanding. Records of cloudiness from satellites originally designed to monitor weather are prone to spurious trends related to changes in satellite orbit, instrument calibration, degradation of sensors over time, and other factors.

When the researchers removed such artifacts from the record, the data exhibited large-scale patterns of cloud change between the 1980s and 2000s that are consistent with climate model predictions for that time period, including poleward retreat of mid-latitude storm tracks, expansion of subtropical dry zones, and increasing height of the highest cloud tops. These cloud changes enhance absorption of solar radiation by the earth and reduce emission of thermal radiation to space. This exacerbates global warming caused by increasing greenhouse gas concentrations.

The researchers drew from several independent corrected satellite records in their analysis. They concluded that the behavior of clouds they observed is consistent with a human-caused increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and a planet-wide recovery from two major volcanic eruptions, the 1982 El Chichón eruption in Mexico and the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines. Aerosols ejected from those eruptions had a net cooling effect on the planet for several years after they took place.

Barring another volcanic event of this sort, the scientists expect the cloud trends to continue in the future as the planet continues to warm due to increasing greenhouse gas concentrations. (My bolds)

Another Example of Lop-sided Myopia and Confirmation Bias

The report above violates basic physics, resulting in a gross distortion. Two points are critical. When it comes to clouds, the greenhouse gas that matters is H2O, not CO2. Any IR effects are 96% due to the presence of water vapor and the droplets in the clouds.

And even more importantly, as Dr. Salby illustrated (here), the net effect from clouds is cooling, not warming.

Net cloud forcing is then −15 W m−2. It represents radiative cooling of the Earth-atmosphere system. This is four times as great as the additional warming of the Earth’s surface that would be introduced by a doubling of CO2. Latent heat transfer to the atmosphere (Fig. 1.32) is 90 W m−2. It is an order of magnitude greater. Consequently, the direct radiative effect of increased CO2 would be overshadowed by even a small adjustment of convection (Sec. 8.7).

Convective clouds forming over the Amazon in a blanket smoke. Credit: Prof. Ilan Koren

This is confirmed by other researchers, such as I. Koren, G. Dagan, and O. Altaratz. From aerosol-limited to invigoration of warm convective clouds. Science, 2014; 344 (6188) here.

They then looked at another source of data: that of the Clouds’ and Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES) satellite instruments which measure fluxes of reflected and emitted radiation from Earth to space, to help scientists understand how the climate varies over time. When analyzed together with the aerosol loading over the same area at the same time, the outcome, says Koren, was a “textbook demonstration of the invigoration effect” of added aerosols on clouds. In other words, the radiation data fit the unique signature of clouds that were growing higher and larger. Such clouds show a strong increase in cooling due to the reflected short waves, but that effect is partly cancelled out by the enhanced, trapped, long-wave radiation coming from underneath. (My bold)

More info on clouds is here:Climate Partly Cloudy 

Summary

Once again, atmospheric physics is willfully distorted in order to get a headline and burnish credentials in support of man-made climate change. They promote a myopic and lop-sided picture to frighten a public mostly ill-equipped to see through their mumbo-jumbo.

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Chameleon Climate Models

Chameleon2

Paul Pfleiderer has done a public service in calling attention to
The Misuse of Theoretical Models in Finance and Economics (here)
h/t to William Briggs for noticing and linking

He coins the term “Chameleon” for the abuse of models, and explains in the abstract of his article:

In this essay I discuss how theoretical models in finance and economics are used in ways that make them “chameleons” and how chameleons devalue the intellectual currency and muddy policy debates. A model becomes a chameleon when it is built on assumptions with dubious connections to the real world but nevertheless has conclusions that are uncritically (or not critically enough) applied to understanding our economy. I discuss how chameleons are created and nurtured by the mistaken notion that one should not judge a model by its assumptions, by the unfounded argument that models should have equal standing until definitive empirical tests are conducted, and by misplaced appeals to “as-if” arguments, mathematical elegance, subtlety, references to assumptions that are “standard in the literature,” and the need for tractability.

Chameleon Climate Models

Pfleiderer is writing about his specialty, financial models, and even more particularly banking systems, and gives several examples of how dysfunctional is the problem. As we shall see below, climate models are an order of magnitude more complicated, and abused in the same way, only more flagrantly.

As the analogy suggests, a chameleon model changes color when it is moved to a different context. When politicians and activists refer to climate models, they assert the model outputs as “Predictions”. The media is rife with examples, but here is one from Climate Concern UK

Some predicted Future Effects of Climate Change

  • Increased average temperatures: the IPCC (International Panel for Climate Change) predict a global rise of between 1.1ºC and 6.4ºC by 2100 depending on some scientific uncertainties and the extent to which the world decreases or increases greenhouse gas emissions.
  • 50% less rainfall in the tropics. Severe water shortages within 25 years – potentially affecting 5 billion people. Widespread crop failures.
  • 50% more river volume by 2100 in northern countries.
  • Desertification and burning down of vast areas of agricultural land and forests.
  • Continuing spread of malaria and other diseases, including from a much increased insect population in UK. Respiratory illnesses due to poor air quality with higher temperatures.
  • Extinction of large numbers of animal and plant species.
  • Sea level rise: due to both warmer water (greater volume) and melting ice. The IPCC predicts between 28cm and 43cm by 2100, with consequent high storm wave heights, threatening to displace up to 200 million people. At worst, if emissions this century were to set in place future melting of both the Greenland and West Antarctic ice caps, sea level would eventually rise approx 12m.

Now that alarming list of predictions is a claim to forecast what will be the future of the actual world as we know it.

Now for the switcheroo. When climate models are referenced by scientists or agencies likely to be held legally accountable for making claims, the model output is transformed into “Projections.” The difference is more than semantics:
Prediction: What will actually happen in the future.
Projection: What will possibly happen in the future.

In other words, the climate model has gone from the bookshelf world (possibilities) to the world of actualities and of policy decision-making.  The step of applying reality filters to the climate models (verification) is skipped in order to score political and public relations points.

The ultimate proof of this is the existence of legal disclaimers exempting the modellers from accountability. One example is from ClimateData.US

Disclaimer NASA NEX-DCP30 Terms of Use

The maps are based on NASA’s NEX-DCP30 dataset that are provided to assist the science community in conducting studies of climate change impacts at local to regional scales, and to enhance public understanding of possible future climate patterns and climate impacts at the scale of individual neighborhoods and communities. The maps presented here are visual representations only and are not to be used for decision-making. The NEX-DCP30 dataset upon which these maps are derived is intended for use in scientific research only, and use of this dataset or visualizations for other purposes, such as commercial applications, and engineering or design studies is not recommended without consultation with a qualified expert. (my bold)

Conclusion:

Whereas some theoretical models can be immensely useful in developing intuitions, in essence a theoretical model is nothing more than an argument that a set of conclusions follows from a given set of assumptions. Being logically correct may earn a place for a theoretical model on the bookshelf, but when a theoretical model is taken off the shelf and applied to the real world, it is important to question whether the model’s assumptions are in accord with what we know about the world. Is the story behind the model one that captures what is important or is it a fiction that has little connection to what we see in practice? Have important factors been omitted? Are economic agents assumed to be doing things that we have serious doubts they are able to do? These questions and others like them allow us to filter out models that are ill suited to give us genuine insights. To be taken seriously models should pass through the real world filter.

Chameleons are models that are offered up as saying something significant about the real world even though they do not pass through the filter. When the assumptions of a chameleon are challenged, various defenses are made (e.g., one shouldn’t judge a model by its assumptions, any model has equal standing with all other models until the proper empirical tests have been run, etc.). In many cases the chameleon will change colors as necessary, taking on the colors of a bookshelf model when challenged, but reverting back to the colors of a model that claims to apply the real world when not challenged.

A model becomes a chameleon when it is built on assumptions with dubious connections to the real world but nevertheless has conclusions that are uncritically (or not critically enough) applied to understanding our economy. Chameleons are not just mischievous they can be harmful − especially when used to inform policy and other decision making − and they devalue the intellectual currency.

Thank you Dr. Pfleiderer for showing us how the sleight-of-hand occurs in economic considerations. The same abuse prevails in the world of climate science.

Paul Pfleiderer, Stanford University Faculty
C.O.G. Miller Distinguished Professor of Finance
Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs
Professor of Law (by courtesy), School of Law

Footnote:

There are a series of posts here which apply reality filters to attest climate models.  The first was Temperatures According to Climate Models where both hindcasting and forecasting were seen to be flawed.

Others in the Series are:

Sea Level Rise: Just the Facts

Data vs. Models #1: Arctic Warming

Data vs. Models #2: Droughts and Floods

Data vs. Models #3: Disasters

Data vs. Models #4: Climates Changing

Data vs. Models #4: Climates Changing

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Köppen climate zones as they appear in the 21st Century.

Every day there are reports like this:

An annual breach of 2 degrees could happen as soon as 2030, according to climate model simulations, although there’s always the chance that climate models are slightly underestimating or overestimating how close we are to that date. Writing with fellow meteorologist Jeff Masters for Weather Underground, Bob Henson said the current spike means “we are now hurtling at a frightening pace toward the globally agreed maximum of 2.0°C warming over pre-industrial levels.”

That abstract, mathematically averaged world, the subject of so much media space and alarm, has almost nothing to do with the world where any of us live. Because nothing on our planet moves in unison.

Start with the hemispheres:

Notice that the global temperature tracks with the seasons of the NH. The reason for this is simple. The NH has twice as much land as the Southern Hemisphere (SH). Oceans have greater heat capacity and do not change temperatures as much as land does. So every year when there is almost a 4 °C swing in the temperature of the Earth, it follows the seasons of the NH. This is especially interesting because the Earth gets the most energy from the sun in January right now. That is because of the orbit of the Earth. The perihelion is when the Earth is closest to the sun and that currently takes place in January.

Using round numbers, the Northern Hemisphere (NH) half of the total surface combines 20% land with 30% ocean, while the SH comprises 9% land with 41% ocean. With the oceans having huge heat capacities relative to the land, the NH has much more volatility in temperatures than does the SH. But more importantly, the trends in multi-decadal warming and cooling also differ.

Climates Are Found Down in the Weeds

The top-down global view needs to be supplemented with a bottom-up appreciation of the diversity of climates and their changes.

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The ancient Greeks were the first to classify climate zones. From their travels and sea-faring experiences, they called the equatorial regions Torrid, due to the heat and humidity. The mid-latitudes were considered Temperate, including their home Mediterranean Sea. Further North and South, they knew places were Frigid.

Based on empirical observations, Köppen (1900) established a climate classification system which uses monthly temperature and precipitation to define boundaries of different climate types around the world. Since its inception, this system has been further developed (e.g. Köppen and Geiger, 1930; Stern et al., 2000) and widely used by geographers and climatologists around the world.

Köppen and Climate Change

The focus is on differentiating vegetation regimes, which result primarily from variations in temperature and precipitation over the seasons of the year. Now we have an interesting study that considers shifts in Köppen climate zones over time in order to identify changes in climate as practical and local/regional realities.

The paper is: Using the Köppen classification to quantify climate variation and change: An example for 1901–2010
By Deliang Chen and Hans Weiteng Chen
Department of Earth Sciences, University of Gothenburg, Sweden

Hans Chen has built an excellent interactive website (here): The purpose of this website is to share information about the Köppen climate classification, and provide data and high-resolution figures from the paper Chen and Chen, 2013: Using the Köppen classification to quantify climate variation and change: An example for 1901–2010 (pdf)

The Köppen climate classification consists of five major groups and a number of sub-types under each major group, as listed in Table 1. While all the major groups except B are determined by temperature only, all the sub-types except the two sub-types under E are decided based on the combined criteria relating to seasonal temperature and precipitation. Therefore, the classification scheme as a whole represents different climate regimes of various temperature and precipitation combinations.

Main characteristics of the Köppen climate major groups and sub-types:

Major group  Sub-types
A: Tropical Tropical rain forest: Af
Tropical monsoon: Am
Tropical wet and dry savanna: Aw, As
B: Dry Desert (arid): BWh, BWk
Steppe (semi-arid): BSh, BSk
C: Mild temperate Mediterranean: Csa, Csb, Csc
Humid subtropical: Cfa, Cwa
Oceanic: Cfb, Cfc, Cwb, Cwc
D: Snow Humid: Dfa, Dwa, Dfb, Dwb, Dsa, Dsb
Subarctic: Dfc, Dwc, Dfd, Dwd, Dsc, Dsd
E: Polar Tundra: ET
Ice cap: EF

Temporal Changes in Climate Zones

This study used a global gridded dataset with monthly mean temperature and precipitation, covering 1901–2010, which was produced and documented by Kenji Matsuura and Cort J. Willmott from Department of Geography, University of Delaware. Station data were compiled from different sources, including Global Historical Climatology Network version 2 (GHCN2) and the Global Surface Summary of Day (GSOD).The data and associated documentations can be found at http://climate.geog.udel.edu/climate/html_pages/Global2011/

In the maps below, the Köppen classification was applied on temperature and precipitation averaged over shorter time scales, from interannual to decadal and 30 year. The 30 year averages were calculated with an overlap of 20 years between each sub-period, while the interannual and decadal averages did not have overlapping years. Black regions indicate areas where the major Köppen type has changed at least once during 1901–2010 for a given time scale. Thus, the black regions are likely to be sensitive to climate variations, while the colored regions identify spatially stable regions.

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Chen_and_Chen_2013fig2c

 

Major group Time scales
Interannual (%) Interdecadal (%) 30-year (%)
A                45.5                    89.0                 94.2
B                45.1                    85.2                 91.8
C                35.3                    77.4                 87.3
D                30.0                    83.3                 91.0
E                78.2                    92.8                 96.2

The table and images show that most places have had at least one entire year with temperatures and/or precipitation atypical for that climate.  It is much more unusual for abnormal weather to persist for ten years running.  At 30-years and more the zones are quite stable, such that is there is little movement at the boundaries with neighboring zones.

Over time, there is variety in zonal changes, albeit within a small range of overall variation:

Chen and Chen Conclusions

By using a global gridded temperature and precipitation data over the period of 1901–2010, we reached the following conclusions:

  • Over the whole period (1901–2010), the mean climate distributions have a comparable pattern and portion with previous estimates. The five major groups A, B, C, D, E take up 19.4%, 28.4%, 14.6%, 22.1%, and 15.5% of the total land area on Earth respectively. Since the relative changes of the areas covered by the five major groups are all small on the 30 year time scale, the agreement indicates that the climate dataset used overall is of comparable quality with those used in other studies.
  • On the interannual, interdecadal, and 30 year time scales, the climate type for a given grid may shift from one type to another and the spatial stability decreases towards shorter time scales. While the spatially stable climate regions identified are useful for conservation and other purposes, the instable regions mark the transition zones which deserve special attention since they may have implications for ecosystems and dynamics of the climate system.
  • On the 30 year time scale, the dominating changes in the climate types over the whole period are that the arid regions occupied by group B (mainly type BWh) have expanded and the regions dominated by arctic climate (EF) have shrunk along with the global warming and regional precipitation changes.

Summary: The Myth of “Global” Climate Change

Climate is a term to describe a local or regional pattern of weather. There is a widely accepted system of classifying climates, based largely on distinctive seasonal variations in temperature and precipitation. Depending on how precisely you apply the criteria, there can be from 6 to 13 distinct zones just in South Africa, or 8 to 11 zones only in Hawaii.

Each climate over time experiences shifts toward warming or cooling, and wetter or drier periods. One example: Fully a third of US stations showed cooling since 1950 while the others warmed.  It is nonsense to average all of that and call it “Global Warming” because the net is slightly positive.  Only in the fevered imaginations of CO2 activists do all of these diverse places move together in a single march toward global warming.

Data vs. Models #3: Disasters

Addendum at end on Wildfires

Looking Through Alarmist Glasses

In the aftermath of COP21 in Paris, the Irish Times said this:

Scientists who closely monitored the talks in Paris said it was not the agreement that humanity really needed. By itself, it will not save the planet. The great ice sheets remain imperiled, the oceans are still rising, forests and reefs are under stress, people are dying by tens of thousands in heatwaves and floods, and the agriculture system that feeds 7 billion human beings is still at risk.

That list of calamities looks familiar from insurance policies where they would be defined as “Acts of God.” Before we caught CO2 fever, everyone accepted that natural disasters happened, unpredictably and beyond human control. Now of course, we have computer models to project scenarios where all such suffering will increase and it will be our fault.

For example, from an alarmist US.gov website we are told:

Human-induced climate change has already increased the number and strength of some of these extreme events. Over the last 50 years, much of the U.S. has seen increases in prolonged periods of excessively high temperatures, heavy downpours, and in some regions, severe floods and droughts.

By late this century, models, on average, project an increase in the number of the strongest (Category 4 and 5) hurricanes. Models also project greater rainfall rates in hurricanes in a warmer climate, with increases of about 20% averaged near the center of hurricanes.

Looking Without Alarmist Glasses

But looking at the data without a warmist bias leads to a different conclusion.

The trends in normalized disaster impacts show large differences between regions and weather event categories. Despite these variations, our overall conclusion is that the increasing exposure of people and economic assets is the major cause of increasing trends in disaster impacts. This holds for long-term trends in economic losses as well as the number of people affected.

From this recent study:  On the relation between weather-related disaster impacts, vulnerability and climate change, by Hans Visser, Arthur C. Petersen, Willem Ligtvoet 2014 (open source access here)

Data and Analysis

All the analyses in this article are based on the EM-DAT emergency database. This database is open source and maintained by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the University of Louvain, Belgium (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012).

The EM-DAT database contains disaster events from 1900 onwards, presented on a country basis. . .We aggregated country information on disasters to three economic regions: OECD countries, BRIICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa) and the remaining countries, denoted hereafter as Rest of World (RoW) countries. OECD countries can be seen as the developed countries, BRIICS countries as upcoming economies and RoW as the developing countries.

The EM-DAT database provides three disaster impact indicators for each disaster event: economic losses, the number of people affected and the number of people killed. . .The data show large differences across disaster indicators and regions: economic losses are largest in the OECD countries, the number of people affected is largest in the BRIICS countries and the number of people killed is largest in the RoW countries.

Fig. 3 Economic losses normalized for wealth (upper panel) and the number of people affected normalized for population size (lower panel). Sample period is 1980–2010. Solid lines are IRW trends for the corresponding data.

Fig. 3
Economic losses normalized for wealth (upper panel) and the number of people affected normalized for population size (lower panel). Sample period is 1980–2010. Solid lines are IRW trends for the corresponding data.

The general idea behind normalization is that if we want to detect a climate signal in disaster losses, the role of changes in wealth and population should be ruled out; however, this is complicated by the fact that changes in vulnerability may also play a role. . .(After extensive research), we conclude that quantitative information on time-varying vulnerability patterns is lacking. More qualitatively, we judge that a stable vulnerability V t, as derived in this study, is not in contrast with estimates in the literature.

Climate drivers

Historic trend estimates for weather and climate variables and phenomena are presented in IPCC-SREX (2012, see their table 3-1). The categories ‘winds’, ‘tropical cyclones’ and ‘extratropical cyclones’ coincide with the ‘meteorological events’ category in the CRED database. In the same way, the ‘floods’ category coincides with the CRED ‘hydrological events’ category. The IPCC trend estimates hold for large spatial scales (trends for smaller regions or individual countries could be quite different).

The IPCC table shows that little evidence is found for historic trends in meteorological and hydrological events. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that these two events are the main drivers for (1) economic losses (all regions), (2) the number of people affected (all regions) and (3) the number of people killed (BRIICS countries only). Thus, trends in normalized data and climate drivers are consistent across these impact indicators and regions.

Summary

People who are proclaiming that disasters rise with fossil fuel emissions are flying in the face of the facts, and in denial of IPCC scientists.

Trends in normalized data show constant, stabilized patterns in most cases, a result consistent with findings reported in Bouwer (2011a) and references therein, Neumayer and Barthel (2011) and IPCC-SREX (2012).

The absence of trends in normalized disaster burden indicators appears to be largely consistent with the absence of trends in extreme weather events.

For more on attributing x-weather to climate change see: X-Weathermen Are Back

Addendum on Wildfires

Within all the coverage of the Fort McMurray Alberta wildfire, there have also been lazy journalists linking the event to fossil fuel-driven global warming, with a special delight of this being located near the oil sands.  The best call to reason has come from A Chemist in Langley, who argues for defensible science against mindless activism.  Of course, he has taken some heat for being so rational.

Here is what he said about the data and the models regarding boreal forest wildfires:

Well the climate models indicate that in the long-term (by the 2091-2100 fire regimes) climate change, if it continues unabated, should result in increased number and severity of fires in the boreal forest. However, what the data says is that right now this signal is not yet evident. While some increases may be occurring in the sub-arctic boreal forests of northern Alaska, similar effects are not yet evident in the southern boreal forests around Fort McMurray.

My final word is for the activists who are seeking to take advantage of Albertans’ misfortunes to advance their political agendas. Not only have you shown yourselves to be callous and insensitive at a time where you could have been civilized and sensitive but you cannot even comfort yourself by hiding under the cloak of truth since, as I have shown above, the data does not support your case.

Data vs. Models #2: Droughts and Floods

This post compares observations with models’ projections regarding variable precipitation across the globe.

There have been many media reports that global warming produces more droughts and more flooding. That is, the models claim that dry places will get drier and wet places will get wetter because of warmer weather. And of course, the models predict future warming because CO2 continues to rise, and the model programmers believe only warming, never cooling, can be the result.

Now we have a recent data-rich study of global precipitation patterns and the facts on the ground lead the authors to a different conclusion.

Stations experiencing low, moderate and heavy annual precipitation did not show very different precipitation trends. This indicates deserts or jungles are neither expanding nor shrinking due to changes in precipitation patterns. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that some caution is warranted about claiming that large changes to global precipitation have occurred during the last 150 years.

The paper (here) is:

Changes in Annual Precipitation over the Earth’s Land Mass excluding Antarctica from the 18th century to 2013 W. A. van Wijngaarden, Journal of Hydrology (2015)

Study Scope

Fig. 1. Locations of stations examined in this study. Red dots show the 776 stations having 100–149 years of data, green dots the 184 stations having 150–199 years of data and blue dots the 24 stations having more than 200 years of data.

Fig. 1. Locations of stations examined in this study. Red dots show the 776 stations having 100–149 years of data, green dots the 184 stations having 150–199 years of data
and blue dots the 24 stations having more than 200 years of data.

This study examined the percentage change of nearly 1000 stations each having monthly totals of daily precipitation measurements for over a century. The data extended from 1700 to 2013, although most stations only had observations available beginning after 1850. The percentage change in precipitation relative to that occurring during 1961–90 was plotted for various countries as well as the continents excluding Antarctica. 

There are year to year as well as decadal fluctuations of precipitation that are undoubtedly influenced by effects such as the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) (Davey et al., 2014) and the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) (Lopez-Moreno et al., 2011). However, most trends over a prolonged period of a century or longer are consistent with little precipitation change.Similarly, data plotted for a number of countries and or regions thereof that each have a substantial number of stations, show few statistically significant trends.

Fig. 8. Effect of total precipitation on percentage precipitation change relative to 1961–90 for stations having total annual precipitation (a) 1000 mm. The red curve is the moving 5 year average while the blue curve shows the number of stations. Considering only years having at least 10 stations reporting data, the trends in units of % per century are: (a) 1.4 ± 2.8 during 1854–2013, (b) 0.9 ± 1.1 during 1774–2013 and (c) 2.4 ± 1.2 during 1832–2013.

Fig. 8. Effect of total precipitation on percentage precipitation change relative to 1961–90 for stations having total annual precipitation (a) less than 500 mm, (b) 500 to 1000 mm, (c) more than 1000 mm. The red curve is the moving 5 year average while the blue curve shows the number of stations. Considering only years having at least 10 stations reporting data, the trends in units of % per century are: (a) 1.4 ± 2.8 during 1854–2013, (b) 0.9 ± 1.1 during 1774–2013 and (c) 2.4 ± 1.2 during 1832–2013.

Fig. 8 compares the percentage precipitation change for dry stations (total precipitation <500 mm), stations experiencing moderate rainfall (between 500 and 1000 mm) and wet stations (total precipitation >1000 mm). There is no dramatic difference. Hence, one cannot conclude that dry areas are becoming drier nor wet areas wetter.

Summary

The percentage annual precipitation change relative to 1961–90 was plotted for 6 continents; as well as for stations at different latitudes and those experiencing low, moderate and high annual precipitation totals. The trends for precipitation change together with their 95% confidence intervals were found for various periods of time. Most trends exhibited no clear precipitation change. The global changes in precipitation over the Earth’s land mass excluding Antarctica relative to 1961–90 were estimated to be:

Periods % per Century
 1850–1900 1.2 ± 1.7
 1900–2000 2.6 ± 2.5
 1950–2000 5.4 ± 8.1

A change of 1% per century corresponds to a precipitation change of 0.09 mm/year or 9 mm/century.

As a background for how precipitation is distributed around the world, see the post: Here Comes the Rain Again. Along with temperatures, precipitation is the other main determinant of climates, properly understood as distinctive local and regional patterns of weather.  As the above study shows, climate change from precipitation change is vanishingly small.

Data vs. Models #1 was Arctic Warming.